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Justice.Key Findings at a Glance 
This report presents a series of papers addressing a number of staffing issues in policing: 
determinants of police staffing levels; the processes of hiring and training officers; and retention 
patterns associated with individual officers and staff positions.  The papers are the result of an Urban 
Institute project funded by the National Institute of Justice to develop baseline data and knowledge 
that could prove useful in managing and assessing the federal Community Oriented Policing Services 
(COPS) program (the federal government’s initiative to put 100,000 additional police on the streets 
through hiring grants and other means) as well as inform other research and policy issues in policing. 
Most findings are based on results from a telephone survey with a nationally representative 
probability sample of 1,270  police agencies.  The survey analyses are supplemented by analyses of 
national data on police employment and reviews of prior studies on the determinants of police 
strength.  We present many findings separately for small jurisdictions (those with populations smaller 
than 50,000 persons) and large jurisdictions (those with 50,000 or more persons).  Key findings from 
the study include the following. 
DETERMINANTS OF SWORN FORCE STRENGTH 
Factors influencing police strength (measured in terms of officers or expenditures) are not well 
understood.  A review of 55 empirical studies on the determinants of police strength across places 
and/or over time revealed inconsistent findings for variables commonly used to predict police strength. 
for service, and population were some of the leading contributors to police growth from 1996 to 1999. 
Fiscal constraints and the lack of qualified recruits were two of the leading factors associated with 
police decline during this same period.  Some factors linked to police staffing may be differentially 
associated with police growth and decline; most notably, crime may contribute to growth in staffing 
but not have much influence on reductions in staffing. 
New survey analyses measuring the perceptions of police suggest that grant money, crime, calls 
HIRING AND TRAINING OFFICERS 
The process of screening and training new officers takes an average of 3  1 weeks in small 
agencies and 43 weeks in large agencies.  Ninety-two of every one hundred new hires in small 
agencies and eighty-nine of one hundred in large agencies successfully complete all training. 
recent years due to new training requirements, some of which involve training for community 
policing. 
Over half of small agencies and two-thirds of large agencies reported that a lack of qualified 
applicants caused difficulties in filling recent vacancies.  Close to half of small agencies and over half 
of large agencies also reported modest staffing problems caused by unanticipated vacancies. 
Slightly less than 60% of agencies reported that the length of the training process has increased in 
OFFICER ATTRITION AND TENURE 
Officers serve for shorter periods in small agencies than in large agencies.  Half of officers 
leaving large agencies but only a fifth of those leaving small agencies are retirees.  Further, two-thirds 
... 
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Justice.of departing officers in small agencies and about a third of  those in large agencies leave after five or  0 less years of  service.  It is estimated that nearly half of officers departing small agencies and about a 
quarter of those leaving large agencies go on to other law enforcement work. 
RETENTION OF COPS-FUNDED POSITIONS 
Based on short-term (1  -2 years) follow-up data, approximately three-quarters of agencies with 
expired COPS grants have retained their COPS-funded positions (to this point, virtually all retaining 
agencies have kept all of their COPS positions).  About two-thirds of grantees expect to keep all of 
their non-expired COPS positions, while 74% of small grantees and 80% of large grantees expect to 
keep at least some of their non-expired COPS positions.  Most of these agencies expect to retain the 
COPS positions for 5 or more years. 
Overall, observed and expected retention rates among COPS grantees appear to be fairly 
consistent with historical retention patterns, based on a national analysis of twenty years of police 
employment data which examined retention of new positions by police organizations following 
periods when the organizations grew substantially. 
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Introduction and Summary 
Christopher S. Koper 
1.1.  INTRODUCTION: STUDY BACKGROUND AND SCOPE 
This report contains a collection of readings that examine various staffing issues in policing. 
These readings address three broad issues:  determinants of police staffing levels; the processes of 
hiring, training, and deploying officers; and retention patterns associated with individual officers and 
staff positions.  The papers are the result of an Urban Institute research project funded by the National 
Institute of Justice to, in large part, answer questions of interest to policymakers in the Office of 
Community Oriented Policing Services (Le., the COPS Office), the agency that administers the federal 
Community Oriented Policing Services program.  Passed by Congress as part of the Violent Crime 
Control and Law Enforcement Act of  1994, the COPS program is the federal government’s initiative to 
add 100,000 officers to the nation’s police agencies through grants for hiring new officers and other 
means (see Roth et al. 2000a for an in-depth description and evaluation of the COPS program). 
COPS Office staff sought answers to a number of questions that would assist them in planning, 
managing, and assessing the COPS program.  However, direct evaluation of the COPS program was not 
the focus of this research effort.  Instead, the project emphasized the development of baseline data and 
knowledge that could prove useful in managing and evaluating various aspects of the COPS program, 
such as grantees’ progress in hiring and deploying officers and grantees’ retention of COPS-funded 
positions. Based on discussions with COPS Office staff and additional considerations, we identified a 
series of general research questions covering a range of loosely related police staffing issues. 
What factors determine the size of police agencies, Le., what factors influence variation in 
agency size across places and over time?  Are these factors similar for large and small police 
organizations?  Are the factors contributing to police growth different from those leading to 
reductions in police? 
How long does it typically take to hire, train, and deploy police officers? What are the 
attrition rates in this process?  What problems do agencies encounter in hiring and training 
officers? 
How long do officers serve with their agencies and under what circumstances do  they leave? 
How long do agencies maintain new positions following periods of growth, irrespective of 
the particular officers filling those positions?  How do current and expected retention rates 
for COPS-funded positions compare to historical norms of staff retention? 
’ 
Though these questions are clearly relevant to the administration and assessment of the COPS 
program, they have broader relevance to several research and policy issues. 
In order to address these issues, project staff utilized a number of methods:  critical synthesis of 
literature, analysis of secondary data sources, and collection and analysis of survey data.  The largest 
part of the research effort involved the development of a telephone survey that was administered during 
the summer of 2000 to a nationally representative sample of nearly 1,300  police agencies. The survey, 
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edited book volume than a report with tightly integrated chapters. The remaining chapters of the 
report are divided into two parts.  Part I consists of chapters Two and Three which examine the 
determinants of police agency size using, respectively, critical assessment of existing literature and 
survey data analysis. Employing these complementary approaches, these chapters investigate the 
factors, many of them external to police agencies, which cause variation in the size of police 
organizations across places and over time. 
policymakers as they establish target levels of policing for their jurisdictions.  Once those target levels 
of policing are established, however, the processes of hiring, training, and retaining officers affect both 
the speed with which agencies can reach these target staffing levels and their ability to maintain them. 
Hiring and retention issues are the subjects of chapters Four and Five, which constitute Part I1 of the 
report. Using the H&R survey data, Chapter Four provides descriptive analyses of various aspects of 
police hiring and retention patterns, including the length of time it takes agencies to hire and train new 
officers and the length of time that officers serve with their agencies.  Finally, employing both the 
H&R survey data and analysis of national police employment data, Chapter Five examines retention 
rates for police positions funded through the COPS program and compares these retention rates to 
historical retention norms in police agencies. 
Due to the range of topics explored in this project, the style of this report is more like that of an 
The determinants of sworn force levels investigated in Chapters Two and Three influence 
1.2.  SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
1.2.1.  Determinants of Sworn Force Strength 
Scholars have used three theoretical frameworks to explain variation in police strength. Rational 
public choice theory links variation in police strength to variables such as crime and population, which 
reflect demand for police services. Conflict theory holds that governments increase their police forces 
in response to growth in populations that dominant groups deem to be threatening.  Threatening 
populations may be defined in racial terms (e.g., non-white groups) or in economic terms (e.g., the 
poor and unemployed). Finally, organizational theory stresses internal organizational factors that 
influence the size of police agencies. Empirically, scholars typically approximate these factors by 
using yesterday’s police strength to predict today’s police strength. 
However, the factors influencing police strength are not well understood.  Chapter Two reviews 
55 empirical studies on the determinants of police strength, revealing that with the exception of the 
prior (i.e., lagged) size of the police force, none of the factors commonly studied have been shown to 
influence police levels on a consistent basis.  Consider, for example, the impact of violent crime on 
police strength.  Though one would expect that increases in violent crime lead to police growth, only 
48% of the studies examining the impact of violent crime on police found the expected positive 
association.  Forty-five percent of the studies found no statistically meaningful effect of violent crime 
on police, and seven percent found a significant inverse relationship between these variables 
(suggesting that increases in violent crime lead to reductions in police strength).  The mixed findings 
of prior research are largely attributable to a number of methodological points, such as variation in the 
definition of police strength across studies (some studies measure police strength in terms of personnel 
while others measure it in terms of expenditures), variation in the unit of analysis across studies (e.g., 
cities, states, etc.), poor and/or inconsistent model specification, and complexities involved in 
disentangling the mutual effects which variables like crime and police levels have upon each other. 
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is the call for more research on the interpretations and assessments of actors who make decisions about 
police strength.  Indeed, prior studies have generally treated the decision-making process as a black 
box, using aggregate-level correlations between police strength and other factors to make indirect 
inferences about the process.  Chapter Three takes a modest step towards rectifying this by using the 
H&R survey data to examine police officials’ perceptions about factors that caused changes in the size 
of their agencies from 1996 through 1999. An advantage to studying the determinants of police 
strength in this way is that it taps into the perceptions of people who have insight into the actual 
process by which staffing levels are set. 
agencies grew during this period, while only 11% of large agencies (defined as those serving 
jurisdictions of 50,000 or more persons) and 22% of small agencies (defined as those serving 
jurisdictions with fewer than 50,000 persons) decreased in size.  Respondents’ perceptions supported 
some of the leading theories about influences on police staffing:  among both large and small agencies, 
changes in crime, calls for service, and population had important influences on growing agencies, 
while changes in government revenue and fiscal constraints (including generally declining economic 
conditions) had notable impacts on shrinking agencies. 
As the preceding statement suggests, however, some of the factors associated with changes in 
police staffing may have differential effects on growth and decline in police agencies. If true, this may 
help to explain some of the conflicting findings of past research.  Most notably, police perceptions 
suggest that crime fuels growth in staffing but that it has little or no influence on reductions in staffing. 
Rather than causing cutbacks in police, perhaps the potential impact of declining crime rates on police 
staffing is mitigated by organizational inertia and the political difficulties of reducing police forces. 
This implies that rising crime rates have more impact on police agencies than do declining crime rates. 
Consequently, the results of any given study of crime and police staffing could be highly contingent 
on crime trends during the study period and assumptions about the functional form of the relationship 
between the variables. 
Two additional factors that had strong influences on recent trends in police staffing were grant 
money and the availability of qualified recruits.  Police in both growing and shrinking agencies rated 
the availability of grant money as the first or second most important factor affecting changes in the 
size of their agencies (for shrinking agencies, the findings suggest that the availability of grant money 
prevented the agencies from declining further and/or that the absence of grant money facilitated 
reductions in force). The importance of grant money to both growing and declining agencies suggests 
that the federal COPS program has perhaps been the single most important factor both facilitating 
growth and slowing reductions in police strength during the latter 1990s, though we should temper this 
conclusion by noting that the study did not distinguish between the effects of COPS hiring grants and 
other federal or state hiring grants available during the study period.  The availability of qualified 
recruits, or the lack thereof, was an important factor cited by respondents in agencies with declining 
staff, a finding echoed elsewhere in the report.  This finding would seem to be linked to the strong 
economy of recent years; ironically, strong economic times may boost funds available for policing but 
make it more difficult for police organizations to attract and retain recruits. 
Overall, the study period was characterized by police growth.  Slightly over half of police 
1.2.2. Hiring, Training, and Retention of  Officers 
As noted above, police staffing levels are also affected by the success of agencies in hiring, 
training, and retaining officers. The H&R survey provided a descriptive snapshot of hiring and 
retention patterns in police organizations as of the summer of 2000. 
The process of screening and training new officers takes an average of 3  1 weeks in small 
agencies and 43 weeks in large agencies.  Ninety-two of every one hundred new hires in small 
agencies and eighty-nine of every one-hundred new hires in large agencies complete all training 
successfully.  Nearly 60% of  agencies reported that their training time had increased in recent years 
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training time, about a third reported that new training requirements associated with community 
policing had contributed to the increase. 
Over half of small agencies and two-thirds of large agencies reported that a lack of qualified 
applicants caused them at least some difficulty in filling vacancies during 1999. Indeed, this problem 
caused much difficulty for a quarter of small agencies and nearly a third of large agencies.  While we 
do not have historical data to show whether this problem has become worse over time, the findings 
lend credence to anecdotal accounts suggesting that the supply of good police recruits is down 
throughout the nation. 
rates were 5% for large agencies and 7% for small agencies), there were some indications that 
unanticipated vacancies may have exacerbated recruitment difficulties.  Unanticipated vacancies 
caused at least some degree of difficulty in maintaining staffing levels for 56% of large agencies and 
44% of small agencies.  Retirements by baby boom officers are a likely contributor to this pattern, but 
substantial numbers of departing officers are leaving their agencies after only a few years of service. 
An estimated two-thirds of officers who left small agencies and a third of those who left large agencies 
during 1999 had served for 5 or fewer years.  As with the recruitment findings, however, we lack the 
historical data to say whether or not this pattern represents a new development. Further, these officers 
did not all leave the policing profession; overall, an estimated 45% of officers who left small agencies 
and 24% of those who left large agencies continued in other law enforcement work. 
Nevertheless, the findings on officer recruitment and retention could be a warning flag for law 
enforcement.  It is likely that the strong economy of recent years has aggravated recruitment and 
retention problems by luring some potential and new recruits away from law enforcement and into 
better paying jobs in the private sector.  Current criticism of police over matters such as racial 
profiling and excessive use of force could be discouraging some from the profession as well.  Further, 
the recent hiring binge in law enforcement, fueled by the COPS program, may have significantly 
drained the pool of potential applicants, thereby increasing competition between agencies for good 
officers.  These problems could become worse as larger numbers of baby boom officers enter their 
retirement years.  This raises the danger that some agencies may feel pressure to lower their standards 
in order to fill positions, a move which has had demonstrably negative consequences in some places. 
Hence, strengthening methods for recruiting and retaining qualified officers could be emerging as one 
of the major contemporary challenges facing law enforcement administrators. 
Another implication of the findings is that efforts by  the COPS Office and other agencies to 
increase police staffing through grants for hiring new officers may be approaching a saturation point, 
at least for the present.  Hence, COPS grants that attempt to put more officers in the field through 
efficiency gains from newly funded civilians and technology, rather than through funding new sworn 
officers, could begin to assume a more prominent role in OCOPS’ funding efforts.  Of course, it 
remains to be seen whether the nation’s changing economic conditions will alter the patterns of hiring 
and retention observed in this study. 
Although overall attrition rates in police agencies did not seem unusually high during 1999 (the 
1.3. RETENTION OF COPS-FUNDED POSITIONS AND 
HISTORICAL PATTERNS OF STAFF RETENTION 
Chapter Five deviates somewhat from the earlier chapters by examining an issue of direct relevance 
to the performance of the federal COPS program -  post-grant retention of COPS-funded positions.  As 
noted above, the COPS program represents the federal government’s recent effort to add 100,OOO 
additional police to the nation’s communities.  Grants to state and local agencies for hiring new officers 
represent the largest part of this effort. When the COPS Office reached the milestone of funding 100,OOO 
officers in May 1999, about 61,000 of these officers had been funded through COPS hiring grants. 
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COPS grantees retain COPS-funded positions (irrespective of the individual officers filling those 
positions) after fulfilling COPS programmatic requirements mandating that grantees keep these 
positions for one full budget cycle following the expiration of the three-year grants.  In other words, 
how much of the police expansion funded by COPS will prove to be only temporary? 
of agencies in the H&R survey sample.  The selected agencies, all 1995 COPS hiring grantees, were 
among the earliest COPS hiring grantees and, therefore, represent grantees most likely to have 
positions that are, or are close to being, programmatically expired (i.e., positions which have been 
expired for more than one full budget cycle).  Note, however, that even among this group of early 
grantees, less than half had programmatically expired COPS positions.  Based on the timing of the 
survey, moreover, the positions that were programmatically expired had been so for only 1 or, at most, 
2 years.  Therefore, the reported retention rates reflect only short-term experience. 
positions without using cuts or attrition of other positions, at least in the short term.  (Note that the 
retention figures reported here refer to the percentage of agencies retaining positions rather than the 
specific number of positions that the agencies are retaining; the latter issue will be the subject of a 
forthcoming report.) Virtually all grantees reported having kept either all or none of the COPS positions. 
When asked about expected retention of non-expired COPS positions, about two-thirds of 
grantees anticipated keeping all of the positions, but 74% of small agencies and 80% of large agencies 
expected to keep at least some of the positions.  However, a small group of agencies, particularly in 
small jurisdictions, may retain their COPS positions for only a few years.  Whereas 74% of small 
agencies expected to keep at least some COPS positions after expiration, only about 68% expected to 
retain the positions for as long as five years. 
Overall, therefore, it appears that retention rates among COPS grantees will be far from perfect. 
On the other hand, a substantial majority of  COPS grantees will keep some or all of their COPS- 
funded positions.  Most agencies expecting to retain COPS positions anticipate retaining them all, and 
most expect to keep them for the long term. 
Should we view these retention rates as evidence of success or failure?  One way that we might 
begin to address this question is to put COPS retention rates into an appropriate context. To this end, 
project staff analyzed twenty years of national data (1975-1994) on police employment to determine how 
long agencies typically retained new positions following significant staffing increases (defined as an 
increase of 20% or more in small agencies and 5%  or more in large agencies) in the years prior to the 
COPS program.  The historical analysis revealed that it is not uncommon for agencies to fail to retain 
new positions, particularly in the long term (i.e., 5 or more years). Following a period of staffing growth, 
small agencies tended to retain at least some of the new positions on a short term basis (i.e., 1-2 years) in 
72% to 8 1  % of cases while retaining new positions for as long as five years in only 59% of cases. For 
large agencies, the short-term retention rates (for keeping at least some of the positions) were 87% to 
92%, and the 5-year rate was 79%. These numbers are quite comparable to the observed and expected 
retention rates reported by COPS grantees for expired and non-expired positions. 
least indefinite, basis will require the federal government to fund more than 100,000 officers, perhaps 
substantially more.  OCOPS has continued to fund new officers since May of  1999, so the goal of 
putting 100,000  officers on the street may still be met.  Some might consider the need to fund more 
than 100,000 officers to be evidence of program failure.  On the other hand, the data available at this 
point provide tentative indications that retention rates for COPS funded positions will be comparable 
to historical norms.  Therefore, it seems that money spent raising police staffing levels through COPS 
hiring grants will produce a return on investment very comparable to the typical return on investments 
to increase police staffing. 
To investigate this issue, we examined retention experiences and projections among a subsample 
Nearly threequarters of COPS grantees having expired positions reported having kept all of their 
Overall, it seems that putting an additional 100,000 officers on the street on a permanent, or at 
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Research Evidence on the Factors 
Influencing Police Strength in the 
United States 
Edward R. Maguire 
2.1. INTRODUCTION 
Over the past 30 years, there have been more than fifty empirical studies on the “causes” of police 
strength.  These studies have used a variety of  theories, data sources, and statistical methods to explain 
variation in police strength over time and across jurisdictions.  Some of the studies are methodical, 
careful and precise, while many use faulty methods and bad data.  Although there has been some 
progress made in the statistical methods used, overall there has not been much effort devoted to the 
incremental development of a scientific body of knowledge.  Researchers routinely ignore the cautions 
and findings of previous research.  As a result, it is difficult to synthesize the results of this large body 
of research into a succinct summary of the causes and correlates of police strength.  Nevertheless, by 
carefully sorting through the research, it may be possible to distill a set of robust findings.  That is the 
aim of this chapter. 
the term police strength and how it has been operationalized by researchers.  Next, I discuss theories 
that have been used to frame analyses of police strength.  Unlike some areas of police scholarship, 
studies of police strength tend to be well rooted in one of at least three strong theoretical traditions, 
each with a growing mass of research evidence (Nalla, 1992). Finally, we conclude this section with a 
brief discussion of the methods used in this line of research.  Researchers have clearly established the 
simultaneity between police strength and crime, and special methods are needed to disentangle this 
complex relationship.  To truly understand this long line of research, it is necessary to understand 
these three components: the meaning and measurement of police strength, theories used to explain 
variations in police strength, and the methods used to test these theories. 
In section 2.1, I introduce the major pieces in the police strength puzzle.  I begin by discussing 
2.1.1. What is Police Strength? 
Police strength is an imprecise term.  Researchers have operationalized it in a number of ways, 
the three most common being the number of sworn police officers, the number of police employees, 
and the amount of police expenditures. Researchers using police expenditures justify it on the basis 
that policing is a personnel intensive industry, and there is an almost perfect correlation between the 
number of police personnel that a jurisdiction employs and the amount it spends on police protection 
(later in this report we will examine the validity of this argument).  A handful of researchers have also 
discussed the difference between absolute and relative police strength (Chamlin and Langworthy, 
1996; Slovak, 1986). Absolute strength is the raw number of officers or employees or amount of 
expenditures in a jurisdiction, while relative strength expresses these variables as a ratio (usually per 
capita or per unit area).  Thus, if we multiply the three potential measures of police strength by the two 
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this line of research.  In addition, other researchers have pointed out that explaining variations in 
police strength across jurisdictions is very different than explaining changes in police strength (growth 
and decline) within a jurisdiction (or sample of jurisdictions) over time.  Several researchers have 
recently suggested that one reason for disparate research findings is that these three choices about how 
to measure police strength-to  use employees, officers or expenditures, to use rates or raw numbers, 
and to use differences or levels - matter greatly (Chamlin and Langworthy, 1996; Marvel1 and Moody, 
1996; Nalla, Lynch and Leiber, 1997; Slovak, 1986; Snipes, 1993). 
2.1.2.  Theories Explaining Variation in Police Strength 
organizations is the use of theory (Eck and Maguire 2000). Studies of police strength are typically 
based (at least implicitly) on one or more of the following three theoretical foundations: (1) rational 
public choice (or consensus) theory, (2) conflict theory, and/or (3) some form of organizational theory 
(Nalla, Lynch, and Leiber, 1997). 
Rational public choice (also known as consensus or economic) theory implies that police 
organizations grow in response to citizens’ consensual requests for increased public service and 
protection, often in the face of rising crime rates.  This theory implies that local governments and 
police administrators dole out resources systematically.  For decades, communities have relied on 
various methods for determining the appropriate amount of police resources in given times and places. 
These methods range from informal rules of thumb, such as the need to have at least two officers per 
thousand residents, to more complex mathematical models implemented in computer software 
packages (Bayley, 1994; Chaiken, 1975; Larson, 1978; O’Boyle, 1990; Stenzel, 1993). The kinds of 
variables that have typically been included in these formal and informal systems are the usual 
suspects: crime rates, population, calls-for-service, and other correlates of police workload.  These 
various methods reflect an implicit theory of administrative rationality, suggesting that police strength 
is a function of a few simple workload variables.  Research evidence on the strength of this theory is 
thoroughly mixed.  Most rigorous tests of this theory have concluded that it alone is incapable of 
explaining variations in police strength (Chamlin and Langworthy, 1996). As Loftin and McDowall 
(1982:400) conclude, rational choice or economic models are “too simple to account for the 
relationship between crime and police strength.”  They suggest that models of police strength need to 
account for other factors in the social and political environment of police organizations. 
If police strength is not based on a rational adjustment to variations in crime rates, then what 
other factors are important?  Conflict theory posits that racial and economic inequality lead the 
powerful members (elites) in a community to exert political influence over social control institutions. 
Such conflict processes would lead to increases in social control over the powerless.  Tests of conflict 
theory have concentrated on racial and/or economic sources of conflict. These tests are usually done 
by examining whether variations or changes in the size of “threatening” populations produce 
differences in police force strength.  Research on social threat or conflict theory is also 
overwhelmingly mixed, although there is evidence to support both racial conflict (e.g., Jackson and 
Carroll, 1981; Liska et al., 1981; Snipes, 1993) and economic or class conflict explanations (e.g., 
Jacobs, 1978, 1979). 
Finally, organizational theories examine the effect of processes within police organizations in 
producing increases or decreases in police strength.  This class of theories is the least developed of the 
three discussed in this report.  Typically, the only explanation offered in this line of research is 
organizational inertia: that changes in police strength are incremental and that the best predictor of 
police strength in a given year js its value in the prior year (known as a “lag”).  Thus, unlike other 
perspectives, organizational explanations assume that changes in police strength are based on 
conditions internal to the organization.  According to Nalla and his colleagues (1997: 120): 
One area in which this body of research is more developed than other lines of research on police 
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annual budgets, is explained by incremental specification models whereby the present 
year’s budget is influenced by appropriations in the previous year. 
Numerous studies have found evidence to support the organizational inertia explanation (Nalla, 
1992; Nalla, et al., 1997). This explanation has at least two shortcomings: (1) it is banal in the sense 
that the lag value of any variable in a time series is nearly always the best predictor of  the current 
value, and (2) it is useful for understanding stability in police strength, but it is not useful for 
understanding growth and decline over time.’  Overall, the organizational explanations in this 
literature tend not to be well-specified, treating police organizations as a “black box.”  Further 
developing this class of explanations will require researchers to open up the box and look inside. 
In all, the studies drawn from these three theoretical perspectives have examined the effects of 
many different variables on police strength.  In section 2.2, we examine the universe of variables 
thought to explain variations in police strength, assessing the weight of research evidence for each. 
2.1.3. Methods 
The methods used in examining the determinants of police strength continue to grow more 
sophisticated, with recent refinements suggesting some excellent reasons for the mixed findings 
obtained in the past (Brandl, Chamlin, and Frank, 1995; Snipes, 1993). The relationship between 
police strength and crime rates is known as a “simultaneous” or “reciprocal” causal relationship 
because each one is known to cause the other.  A variety of specialized methods have been devised by 
researchers to disentangle simultaneous causal effects.  Since economists have a classic chicken-and- 
egg problem of their own - supply and demand - they have developed many of the statistical methods 
for dealing with simultaneity.  While some of the early studies relied on improperly specified cross- 
sectional models that ignored the simultaneity issue, most of the studies done over the past two 
decades have relied on increasingly sophisticated cross-sectional and longitudinal models (Fox, 198  1). 
For this and other reasons, economists have done the bulk of the research on police strength.  The 
findings from this research are not widely known for at least two reasons: (1) many of the articles 
appear in economic journals, and (2) the methods used are probably difficult for criminologists and 
policy makers to understand without advanced training in econometrics.  Because these methods are 
crucial to the interpretation of research on police strength, we discuss them throughout this chapter. 
2.2.  THE EVOLUTION OF RESEARCH ON POLICE STRENGTH 
Research on the causal forces that shape police strength was initiated in the 1950s by economists. 
Their interest in the police was generally indirect; only one part of a broader focus on public 
expenditures, economies of scale, and other economic issues.  The earliest economic research on this 
topic examined policing as just one of a host of municipal expenditures, including fire, roads and 
highways, recreation, sanitation, education, and public welfare (Brazer, 1959; Hirsch, 1959).  Brazer’s 
National Bureau of Economic Research working paper, City Expenditures in the United States, seem 
to be the earliest study cited in this area of research.  Hirsch (1959) examined several causal 
explanations for expenditure patterns in St. Louis area police departments.  However, because his 
focus was on whether city growth or consolidation produces economies of  scale, he only reports 
findings for the effect of population variables.  Dye’s (1969) study examined the effect of income 
inequality on a number of public policy outcomes, including police expenditures, but does not report 
all of his findings.  A handful of other studies appeared throughout the 1960s, but these generally 
As Chamlin and Langworthy (1996:181) conclude, “once one controls for prior levels of  police force size, there 
1 
is little variance to be explained by any theoretically derived predictors.” 
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either police or crime had a causal effect on the other.  As numerous researchers have pointed out, 
however, it is not possible to disentangle the simultaneous causal relationship between police strength 
and crime rates using correlations computed from cross-sectional data.  Therefore these studies are not 
revie  wed here. 
With this foundation established, the study of police strength began in earnest in the early 1970s. 
Table 2.1 reviews 55 studies that have sought to explain variation in police strength over time or place 
using statistical methods.  To be included in this table, a study had to meet several criteria: (1) the 
dependent variable is a measure of police strength, (2) there is at least one independent variable, (3) 
the effect of the independent variables is assessed using inferential statistics other than simple 
bivariate correlations computed from cross-sectional data, and (4) enough information is reported to 
determine the strength or significance of the effects of the independent variables.  Within these 55 
studies are 75 separate sets of analyses.  I present multiple sets of analyses separately only if they rely 
on either different samples, different dependent variables, or very different methodologies. 
2.2.2.  Methodological Issues 
Because methodological issues are so important to understanding this line of research, I discuss 
some of these issues prior to moving on to the substantive findings.  Reviewing some of the research 
design issues appearing in table 2.1 is a good place to start. The studies are presented in chronological 
order so that it easier to detect trends in the evolution of research.  We begin with the general research 
designs used to examine the causes of police strength.  Of the 75 separate sets of analyses, 32 (43%) 
used cross-sectional designs, basing their analyses on data from a sample of jurisdictions at one point 
of jurisdictions at two or three different points in time.  Five (7%) used pooled time-series cross- 
sectional designs based on data from a sample of jurisdictions at multiple points in time.  The study 
with the shortest number of time points in these analyses contained data from 10 years.  Finally, 28 of 
the analyses (37%) used time-series designs based on data from a single jurisdiction at multiple points 
in time.  A quick glance at table 2.1 shows how this research has evolved from mostly cross-sectional 
designs to one of the three other types of longitudinal designs.  If we split this nearly three decades of 
research in half, we find that prior to 1985,45% of the studies used longitudinal designs, compared 
with 83% since 1985. 
mentioned earlier, there are good reasons to suspect that police (P) and crime (C) have a simultaneous 
causal effect on the other.  Disentangling this simultaneity represents an enormous challenge for two 
bodies of research: the causes of police strength, as discussed in this report (the effect of C on P), and 
some of the research on general deterrence (the effect of P on C). For two decades, Fisher and Nagin 
(1978; Nagin, 1978, 1998) have pointed out that one of the most serious problems in previous research 
on the deterrent effects of criminal sanctions was inadequate model identification.  Model 
identification is a technical matter beyond the scope of this report, but the following example 
illustrates the general concept.  Suppose we were to collect data from 100 cities on the crime rate (C) 
and the number of police (P). Given the results of previous research, we would most likely find that 
these two variables are highly (and positively) correlated.  The problem of course, when using cross- 
sectional data, is that we would not know whether the correlation was due to the effect of P on C, C on 
P, the influence of a third variable on both P and C, or the simultaneous effect of each one on the 
other.  Thus, given only these two variables, we would not be able to estimate the effect of C on P 
because there is insufficient information in the model to produce unique estimates. 
1)  in time.  Ten of the analyses (13%) used two or three-wave panel designs based on data from a sample 
The defining methodological issue in research on the causes of police strength is simultaneity.  As 
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Dependent 
Authors  Designa  Timeb  location  SimultaneityC  Variable( s)d  Independent variablese 
Bordua & Haurek (1970)  TS  1902.1960  United States  NA  Police Expenditures  Inflation (+), Population Growth (+), Motor Vehicle 
(National)  Registrations (+), Urbanization (+) 
Morris & Tweeten (1971)  Panel  1967&  754 U.S. Cities  Lag  Police Employees  Lag Police Employees (+), Crime (+), % Nonwhite (0), 
1968  Median Age (O),  Median Income (0), Density 
(.), % Male (0), Region (0/3),  City Size (018) 
Weicher (1971)  cs  1959  38 Chicago  NA  Police Officers  Population (. 3/3),  Retail Sales (+ 3/3), Absolute Median 
Family Income (. 3/3),  Relative Median Family Income (+ 
1/2),  lnterquartile Range of Income (+) 
... ...-  ...................................................................  ....  _  .........................................................  ......................  ....................................................... 
Police Districts 
Walzer (1972)  cs  1958  &  31 Illinois  NA  Police Expenditures  Scale of Operations (. 2/2), Scale of Operations2 (+ 1/2), 
Density (+ 2/2),  Police per Capita (+ 2/27, Arrest (+ 1/2), 
Recruit Wages (0/2), Area (+ 2/2) 
1960  Cities 
Carr-Hill  and Stern (1973)  cs  (a)  1961  64 British  2SLS  Police Officers  Clearance Rate (0), % Middle Class ( ), % Violent Offenses 
(b) 1966  66 & 110  2SLS  Police Officers  Clearance Rate (+ 1/2), % Middle Class (  2/2), % Violent 
Police Districts  (0) 
British Police  Offenses (  2/2),  % Urbanized (+), Density (0) 
_._  Districts 
Greenwood & Wadycki (1973)  CS  1960 &  199 SMSAs  3SLS  (a) Police  Property Crime (+), Violent Crime (+), Median Family 
1962  Expenditures  Income (+), Property Taxes (+) 
(b) Police Employees  Police Expenditures (+) 
Jones (1974)e  TSCS  1950.1968  155 U S  Cities  Lag  Police Expenditures  Murder (+ 6/6), Violent Crime (+ 6/6), Total Crime (+ 6/6) 
McPheters & Stronge (1974)  CS  1970  43 U.S  Cities  2SLS  Police Expenditures  Crime (+), Municipal Budget (+) 
Swimmer (1974a)  cs  1960  118 U S  Cities  2SLS  Police Expenditures  Violent Crime (0), Property Crime (+), Median Income (+), 
-.. 
Population (+), Population2( ), Region (.), Property Tax 
Revenue (+), Area (.) 
Swimmer (1974b)  cs  1960  119 U.S. Cities  2SLS  Police Expenditures  Violent Crime (0), Median Income (0), Population (+), 
Population2(-), Property Crime (+), Region (0), Property 
Tax  Revenue (+), Area (.) 
..........  ~ .....................................................  "  ....  ~  ......................................................  - .................................................................................................................................................................................................  ...... 
Phillips & Votey  (1975)  cs  1966  50 California  None  Police Employees  Median Income (0/2),  Ratio Nonviolent/Violent  Crime 
Counties  (0/2), Total Crime (+1/2),  Police Wages (0/2) 
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Chapman (1976)  TSCS  1960-1970  147 CA  Cities  2SLS  Police Officers  Patrolmen Wages (-), Property Crimes (+), Violent Crimes 
(0), Property Values (+), % Blue Collar (.), Public 
Transportation Use (0) 
Dye (1976)  cs  N  /A  245 U.S. Cities  None  Police Manpower  Population (+), Income (0), Race (+), Homeowning (.), 
Crime (+), Revenue (+) 
__  - 
Land & Felson (1976)  TS  1947.1972  US  National  Lag  Police Expenditures  Property Crime (+1/2),  Violent Crime (0), Consumer Price 
Index (+2/2),  GNP (0) 
Mathieson & Passell (1976)  CS  197  1  NYPD Precincts  2SLS  Police Officers  Robbery (+), Homicide (+), Population (+ 2/2), Street Miles 
(N not 
Reported) 
(+ 1/2),  Business District (+ 1/2), Presence of 
Parks/Airports (0/2),  Manhattan (+ 2/2) 
Carr.Hill and Stern (1977)  cs  1971  41 British  None  Police Officers  Crime (+2/2),  Clearance (+1/2),  % Middle Class (0/2),  % 
Police Districts  Violent Offenses (+2/2),  % Urban (0/2) 
Victor (1977)  Panel  1960&  130 US.  Cities  Lag 
1962 
Police Expenditures  Violent Crime (+) 
..........................................  ....................................................................  ..........................................................................................  .  .- ......  ...................................................................................  ........................................................  ............................................................................... 
Bahl, Gustely & Wasylenko  cs  1972  79 US.  Cities  2SLS  Police Employees  Police Compensation (+), Price of Private Goods (0), 
(1978)  Income (+), Grants in Aid (+), Crime (+), Population (+), 
Median Education Level (.), % Nonwhite (+) 
...........................................................................................................  .................  - ...........................................................................................................................................................................................  ............................................................................ 
Fox (1  978)  TS  1950-1974  United States  (a)  Lag  Police Expenditures  Total Crime (+) 
(b) 2SLS  Police Employees  Police Expenditures (+) 
Wilson & Boland (1978)  cs  1975  35 Cities  (1) N/A  Patrol Units  Police Officers (+), % Two.officer Cars (.), Housing Density 
(0), Population (.) 
Property Crime (0), Personal Crime (+), Tax Base (+), 
Officers' Salary (0), Region (0) 
(2) 2SLS  Police Officers 
Wolpin (1978)  TS  1894-1967  England &  Lag  Police Officers  Property Crimes (0), Personal Crimes (+), Lag Police 
Wales 
(National) 
Officers (0), Local Expenditures (.), Motor Vehicles (0) 
.......................................................................  ....  .............  .............................................................................................................................  "  "  .................................................................... 
Cloninger & Sartorius (1979)  TS  1960.1975  Houston  Lag  Police Officers  Auto Thefts (+), Area (-),  Bank Debits (+), Growth (0), 
Density (0) 
Auto Thefts (+), Area (0), Bank Debits (+), Growth (.), 
Density (0) 
Police Expenditures 
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Hakim, Ouadia, Sage &  cs  1970  94 New Jersey  2SLS  Police Expenditures  Property Crime (+), Total Crime (+), Population (.2/2) 
Weinblatt (1979)  Suburbs 
Jacobs (1979)  cs  (a)  1960  96 SMSAs  None  Police and  Economic Inequality ( + 5/8),  Resource Level (0/8), % 
Corrections  Black (0/8),  % Unemployed (0/8), Drug & Liquor Stores 
Employees  (+ 8/8),  South (OB),  Crime (0/4), Log Population (014) 
Corrections 
Employees 
(b) 1970  121 SMSAs  None  Police and  Economic Inequality ( + 8/8), Resource Level (0/8), % 
Black (+ 7/8),  % Unemployed (1/8), Drug & Liquor Stores 
(+ 8/8), Riots (0/8), South (0/8),  Crime (4/4),  Log 
Population (+ 214) 
Mehay (1979)  cs  1968.1969  71  Los Angeles  Lag  (a)  Patrol Officers  Property Valuation (+), Injury Traffic Accidents (0), Violent 
Crime (+), Density (0), Contract Agency (.) 
Property Valuation (+), Injury Traffic Accidents (0), Violent 
Crime (+), Density (0), Contract Agency (.) 
Area Cities 
(b) Police 
Expenditures 
Fujii & Mak (1980)  cs  1975  25 Hawaii  2SLS  Police Employees per  Crime (0), Median Income (0), Density (+), Hotel Rooms 
Districts  Acre  per Acre (+), Hotel Rooms per Acre2 (.) 
..................................  ....................................  ........................................  -.. .  ._.  .....................  ..._....  .............................................................................................................................................................................  ..................................  .............  ....................... 
Hakim (1980)  cs  1970  66 New Jersey  NA  Police Expenditures  Wealth (+6/6), Density (+4/4), Violent Crime (+2/4), 
Property Crime (.1/6.+1/6),  % Single or Dual Family 
Dwellings (+2/4) 
Suburbs 
Huff & Stahura (1980)  cs  1970-1972  252 U.S.  2SLS  Police Employees  % Low income (+2/2), % Black (+2/2),  Violent crime (+), 
Suburbs  Property crime (0) 
.  ~  ._  ^  ...  ~  ..............................  ._  ...................................  ".."  .... -."..."."I  ..........  "  ..........................  ......  ^  ...  .. ............... 
Furlong & Mehay (1981)  cs  1973  38 Montreal  2SLS  Police Officers  Major Crimes (0), Median Home Value (0), Retail Sales (0), 
Police Districts  Income (0), Density (.), Calls for Service (+) 
Jackson &Carroll (1981) 
........................................................................................................ 
Liska, Lawrence & Benson 
(1981) 
cs  1970  90 U.S. Cities  2SLS 
..........................................................................  ~ ..........  ...........  _. .........  ........................... 
(a) CS  1952,  109 U.S. Cities  None 
1957, 
1962, 1967 
& 1972 
(b)Panel  1957,  -  109 U.S. Cities  Lag 
1962, 1967 
& 1972 
Police Expenditures  Population (0), Density (0), % Black (0), % Black2 (0), % 
Black3 (0), Poverty (0), Black/White Income (0), Protest 
(+), Riot (+), Region (+), Household Activity Ratio (+) 
..........................................................................  ..............  ~  .....  ................  ................. 
Police Employees  Population (+ 7/10),  Segregation (. 3/10),  % Nonwhite (+ 
5/10), Property Crimes (+ 4/10), Personal Crimes (0/10) 
Police Emp  I  oyees  Population (+ 2/8),  Segregation (+ 114, . 1/4), % 
Nonwhite (+ 3/8),  Property Crimes (+ 2/8),  Personal 
Crimes (0/8), Lag Police Size (+ 8/8) 
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Greenberg €4  Kessler (1982)  Panel  1960 &  130 U.S. Cities  Lag  Police Expenditures  Lag Police Expenditures (+4/4),  Lag Violent Crime (.1/3), 
1962  Violent Crime (+1/3) 
Lizotte, Mercy & Monkkonen  TS  1947.1970  Chicago  Lag  (a) Police  Property Crime (+), Business Failures (.), Traffic Citations 
(1982)  (+), % under 21  (.), Lag Police Expenditures (+), Taxes (+) 
% Black (+), % Professional (.), Average firm size (+), 
Business failures (+), Police Expenditures (+) 
Expenditures 
(b) Police Officers 
Loftin & McDowall (1982)  TS  1926.1977  Detroit  Granger  Police Employees  Total Crime (0), Violent Crime (0), Property Crime (0) 
Greenberg, Kessler & Loftin  Panel  1960&  (a) 252 U.S.  Lag  Police Employees  Violent Crime (+ 2/2),  Property Crime (0/2),  Lag Police 
(1  983)  1970  Suburbs  Employees (+ 2/2),  Density (. 2/2),  Population (+ 1/2), % 
Black (0/2), % Low Income (-  2/2), yo  Age 15.30 (+ 212) 
Violent Crime (+ 2/2),  Property Crime (. 2/2),  Lag Police 
Employees (+ 2/2),  Mean Income (+ 1/2), Inequality (0/2), 
% Nonwhite (+ 2/2) 
(b) 269 U.S.  Lag 
Cities 
Police Employees 
Hakim, Spiegal & Weinblatt  CS  1970  401 New Jersey  2SLS  Police Expenditures  Violent Crimes (+), Municipal Expenditures (+), Auto Thefts 
( 1984)  Cities  (0), Robberies (+), Burglaries (+), Larcenies (+) 
Surette (1984)  TS  1873-1969  Chicago  NA  Police Employees  Value Added by Manufacturers (0/2), Wage Workers (0/2), 
.............................................................................................................  ......................................................................................  ..............................  ........  .-  ......  .......................................................................................... 
Manufacturers (0/2) 
Bayley (1985)h  TS  1946-1976  Multiple Cities,  Lag  Police Employees  Total Crime (2/38),  Murder (3/40), Robbery (8/38), Rape 
Multiple  (7/32),  Riots (4/12) 
Nations 
.............................  .......  ............................................................................  ........  ~ .................................  .............. ._  ...............................  ........................................................  -  ........................  ........................................  .......  -  .....  -  ................  .........................  ............................................................................... 
Greenberg, Kessler & Loftin  Panel  (a)  1950-  259 cities  Lag  Police Employees  Lag Police Employees (+2/2),  Violent Crime (.1/2), 
(1985)  1960  Property Crime (0/2),  Population (+1/2), City Revenue 
(+1/2),  Mean Income (0/2), Inequality (0/2), % Nonwhite 
(+2/2),  % Nonwhite2 (-212) 
Property Crime (0/2),  Population (+1/2),  City Revenue 
(+1/2),  Mean Income (0/2),  Inequality (0/2), % Nonwhite 
(+2/2),  % Nonwhite? (.1/2) 
Property Crime (0/2),  Population (0/2),  City Revenue 
(0/2),  Mean Income (0/2),  Inequality (0/2),  % Nonwhite 
(0/2), % Nonwhite2 (0/2) 
(b) 1960.  260 cities  Lag  Police Employees  Lag Police Employees (+2/2),  Violent Crime (+1/2), 
1970 
(c)  1970-  252  cities  Lag  Police Employees  Lag Police Employees (+2/2),  Violent Crime (0/2), 
1980 
.........................................  .....................................  ..............................  _... .......................................................................................  ................................................................................................................................................................................ 
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Authors  Designa  Timeb  Location  Simultaneityc  Variable(  s)d  Independent variablese 
McDowall & Loftin (1986)  TS  1928-1976  Detroit  Lag  Uniformed Police  Lag Police Employees (+), Crime (0), Registered Vehicles 
Officers  (+), Revenue (+), Government Aid (0), % Nonwhite (0), 
Workers on strike (0), 1967 Riot (+) 
Corman, Joyce & Lovitch  TS  1970 1984  New York City  Granger 
(1987)  (monthly) 
Craig (1987)  cs  1972  79 Baltimore  3SLS 
Police Beats 
__  _.  - ._  - 
Corman &Joyce (1990)  TS  1970-1986  New York City  Granger 
(monthly) 
Chamlin (1990)  TS  1904.1958  Chicago  N/A 
Jackson (1992)  Panel  19708~  563 U S  Cities  None 
1980 
cs  1981  52 U.S. Cities  None 
Police Officers  % Young Males (0), Unemployment (0), Police Officers (+), 
Arrests (O),  Crime (0) 
Police Officers  % Residents Owing Homes (0/2),  % over 65  Years Old ( 
1/2), Mean Income (.2/2),  % Whites ( 1/2),  Reported 
Crime (.2/2) 
Lag Police Officers (+4/4),  Home Relief (+2/4), 
Unemployment (0/4), Robbery  (0), Robbery Arrests (0), 
Assault (+), Assault Arrests (+), Rape (+), Rape Assaults 
(+), Murder (0), Murder Arrests (0) 
_- 
Police Officer 
Police Expenditures  Lag Police Expenditures (0/2),  City Revenues (.2/2),  % 
Black (+2/2),  Unemployment (0/2),  Arrest (0/2), 
Thompson Administration (-2/2) 
City Revenues (+), Index Crime (+), % Poor (.), Population 
(0), Density (+), % Unemployed (+), BlackIWhite Income 
(O),  % Black (+), % Hispanic (0).  Wholesale/Retail Change 
(.), Residents Born in State (-) 
Perceived Gang Problem (+), Black/White Income (0), 
Index Crime (+), Density (0), % Black (+), % Hispanic (0), 
Population (0), City Revenues (.), % Poor (.) 
.  ............... " .....  "  ..... "  -  .....................................................................  ............................ 
Police Expenditures 
Police Expenditures 
(as a proportion of 
City Expenditures) 
Nalla (1992)  TS  1948-1984  U.S.  National  Lag  Police Expenditures  Lag Police Expenditures (+), Income Inequality (.), 
Nonwhite arrests (0), % Nonwhite (0), Crime (+), Motor 
Vehicles (0) 
Snipes (1993)  TS  1904.1957  Chicago  Lag  Police Expenditures  Lag Expenditures (0/3),  City Revenues (+ 3/3),  % Black (+ 
3/4), % Italian (+ 1/2), Unemployment (0/3),  Arrests 
(0/3), Mayor Thompson Era (. 3/3) 
Lag Size (+ 3/3),  City Revenues (+ 1/3), % Black (t  2/4), 
% Italian (. 1/2),  Unemployment (0/3),  Arrests (0/3), 
Mayor Thompson Era (0/3) 
Police Employees 
...............................  _ ......... ._  .......................................................  - ...  ....  .............  .........................................................................  ....................................................................  ~ .....  .....  "  ...................................................................................... 
Niskanen (1994)  cs  1991  50 states &  2SLS  Police Employees  Avg Monthly Earnings (.), Avg Annual Income (+), Avg 
D.C.  Annual Federal Aid (+), Violent Crime (+), Property Crime 
(0) 
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Sollars, Benson & Rasmussen  CS  1987  296 Florida  Lag  Police Officers  Property Crime (+), Violent Crime (0), Property Value (+), 
(1994)  Income (0), # of  Local Agencies (.), Government Revenue 
(0), Drug Arrests (+) 
Brandl, Charnlin & Frank  TS  1934-1987  Milwaukee  Lag  (a) Police Employees  Police Expenditures (0), Population (0), Registered 
(1995)  Vehicles (0), Total Crime (0), % Black (+), Riot (0) 
Police Expenditures (0), Population (0), Registered 
Vehicles (0), Total Crime (0), % Black (+), Riot (0) 
Police Expenditures (0), Population (0), Registered 
Vehicles (0), Total Crime (.), % Black (0), Riot (0), Union 
Initiative (0) 
Jurisdictions 
........ .... .. . .........  .....  ... ..........  ..........  .  ......  . ............. ... ..  .......  ......  ..  ..,... .  ........... ... .........  .. ..... .  ... ........................  ..  ..,.............  ~ ..........,...  ..........  ~ ............ .,_.................  ..  .  ......  ....  .....  .......  ,  . .  .... 
(b) Patrol Officers 
(c) Detectives 
Chamlin & Langworthy (1996)  TS  1930-  1987  Milwaukee  Granger  (a) Police Employees  Total Crime (0/2), Property Crime (0/2),  Personal Crime 
(om 
Total Crime (0/2),  Property Crime (0/2),  Robberies (012) 
Total Crime (.1/2),  Property Crime (-2/2), Robberies (.1/2) 
(b) Patrol Employees 
(c) Detective 
Employees 
Marvel1 & Moody (1996)  TSCS  (a)  1968-  49 States  Granger  Police Employees  Total Crime (+9/15),  Homicide (+3/14), Rape (+1/14), 
Robbery (+9/14), Assault (0/14),  Burglary (+9/14), 
Larceny (+5/13),  Auto Theft (+13/14), Lag Police (+,.) 
Robbery (+8/14),  Assault (0/14), Burglary (+10/14), 
Larceny (+3/14),  Auto Theft (+11/14), Lag Police (+1/2) 
Crime (+9/9), Crime2 (. 9/9), Real GDP (+ 4/4), % 
Unemployed (0), Nonwhite/White Median Income (0), 
Republican Strength (+), Ford Presidency (+), % Nonwhite 
(0), Mean Family Income (+), Median Family Income (+ 
1993 
(b) 1971  56 U S  Cities  Granger  Police Employees  Total Crime (+11/16), Homicide (+11/14), Rape (+5/14), 
1992 
-  ._  -  -  ___ 
Jacobs and Helms (1997)  TS  1952-1991  United States  Lag  Police Employees  Economic Inequality (+ 9/9), Economic Inequality' (. 9/9), 
4/4) 
Levitt (1997)  TSCS  1970.1992  59 U.S. Cities  NA  Police Officers  Mayoral Election Year (+ 3/3), Gubernatorial Election Year 
(+ 3/3),  Public Welfare Spending (0/2),  Education 
Spending (+ 2/2),  State Unemployment (0/2),  % Age 15. 
24 in SMSA (0/2),  % Black (0/2), % Female Headed 
Households (0/2) 
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Nalla, Lynch & Leiber (1997)  TS  1950-1988  Phoenix  Lag  (a) Police Officers  % Minority (.4/4),  Violent Arrests (0/2), Property Arrests 
(0/2), Violent Crime (0/2), Property Crime (+2/2), Surplus 
Value (+4/4),  Lag Police Officers (+8/8),  Density (-4/8) 
% Minority (.3/4),  Violent Arrests (+2/2), Property Arrests 
(+2/2), Violent Crime (+2/2), Property Crime (+2/2), 
Surplus Value (+4/4),  Lag Police Expenditures (+8/8), 
Density (.4/8) 
(b) Police 
Expenditures 
Notes 
(a)  CS = cross sectional model, TS = time series model, Panel = 2 or 3 wave panel model, TSCS=  pooled time series.cross sectional model 
(b)  All longitudinal data are yearly unless otherwise noted. 
(c)  Procedures used for dealing with the simultaneity between police and crime: None = no attempt to deal with simultaneity, Lag = lagged measure of crime is included in the police strength equation, 
2SLS/3SLS=two  or three stage least squares regression, Granger = Granger causality test (Granger,  1968), NA = not applicable (for instance, if crime is not included in the equation). 
(d)  Unless otherwise indicated, all police strength measures are per capita except Mathieson and Passell (1976). Corman and Mocan (1996), and some estimates by Chamlin and Langworthy (1996). 
Walzer (1972:318)  expresses the "average cost" of police services as police expenditures divided by a service index, which is the sum of offenses cleared, miles traveled by police vehicles, and 
accidents investigated.  Though Cloninger and Sartorius (1979) express expenditure and officer measures in three ways (per capita, per square mile, and per capita mile), we report only the per capita 
findings. 
(e)  The following symbols are used to summarize the effect of each independent variable on police strength: positive relationship (+), negative relationship (.), non-significant relationship (0).  Fractions are 
used when more than one model is estimated.  Each fraction shows the number of significant coefficients over the total coefficient estimates.  Lag specifications are only reported for lagged dependent 
variables. 
(f)  Carr.Hill and Stern present results from four samples:  1961  urban, 1966  urban, 1966  urban and rural, and a pooled 1961  and 1966 sample.  So that their entry would not occupy an inordinate amount 
of space in the table, we present only two sets of results, including one for urban districts in 1961, and one combining the urban.only and urban.rural estimates from 1966.  We ignore the pooled 1961 
and 1966 findings. 
(g)  Statistical significance levels were not reported,  so I computed them.  All were statistically significant, though the authors interpret the small effects as evidence that crime has "next to nothing" to do 
with how much money cities spend on police protection (Jones, 1994  523). 
(h)  Direction of effects not reported.  This summary excludes a subset of Bayley's findings that are based on correlation coefficients computed on cross-sectional data or on time series data with no lag. 
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that has been frequently used in the studies listed in table 2.1 is to estimate the model in stages, adding 
an outside variable (known as an instrument) to the model that is a known cause of C, but has no 
causal effect on P.* By providing this additional information (known as an “identification 
restriction”), we provide sufficient information into the system of equations to disentangle estimates of 
the effects of P and C on one another.  Several researchers have argued convincingly that prior 
research has paid too little attention to these identification restrictions, choosing instrumental variables 
that are based on unrealistic assumptions (Fisher and Nagin, 1978; Marvell and Moody, 1996; Nagin, 
1978, 1998). Nagin (1978: 118) showed that when the assumptions regarding identification restrictions 
are incorrect, the resulting analysis “can be completely mi~leading.”~  Unfortunately, many researchers 
have failed to heed this advice.  As a result, the findings from many of the studies listed in table 2.1 
are suspect. Recent research continues to fan the flames of  the debate, with some studies paying 
careful attention to the selection of unique instruments (Levitt, 1997), and others ignoring all of the 
cautions raised over the past two decades and choosing unrealistic instruments (Niskanen, 1994).4 
One increasingly popular way of dealing with the simultaneity issue is to use longitudinal data. 
This presents a whole new set of theoretical and methodological issues, but probably represents a 
much better solution than trying to work within the limitations of cross-sectional data. The most 
popular method of dealing with simultaneity in longitudinal research is simply to use the lag value of a 
variable.  For example, if we are using data collected yearly, we could estimate the effect of crime 
rates in one year on police strength in the following year.  In this case, we would be using a “lagged” 
value of crime rates.  Since intuitively we would not expect police strength in, say, 1990 to affect 
crime rates in 1989, this is one popular method for eliminating the simultaneity issue.  While this 
appears, on its surface, to be a reasonable strategy, it has some problems.  Many of these studies do 
not place a great deal of thought into the choice of the appropriate lag period, and there is little theory 
to suggest how long it might take changes in crime to affect levels of police strength.  All of the panel 
studies use lags of one year, as do most of the remaining longitudinal studies.  Some of the time series 
studies use lags measured in months, though there is little reason to expect changes in police strength 
to adjust so quickly to changes in crime (Corman, et al., 1987; Corman and Joyce, 1990). In fact, Fox 
(1978) models police expenditures as a function of crime rates “with a lag structure that begins at two 
years, that contains geometrically declining coefficients, and that has a mean lag of 3.9 years” (also 
see McDowall and Loftin, 1986). Finally, as Marvell and Moody (1996) point out, lagging may not 
actually address simultaneity at all in the presence of autocorrelation, thus it is not a panacea.’ 
The simultaneity column in table 2.1 shows the method used in each study to deal with the 
simultaneity between police strength and crime. While there may be the potential for other variables in 
this table to be simultaneously related, this is the only one I address. Of the 75 separate sets of analyses 
in table 2.1, eight (listed as N/A) do not include measures of crime as independent variables, and 
therefore do not address the simultaneity between police and crime. An additional eight analyses (listed 
as None) include measures of crime but do not use any procedure to address simultaneity. Thus, overall, 
16 of 75 sets of analyses (21%) ignore the simultaneity between police and crime.  Twenty analyses 
Many of the economic articles only estimate models of police strength among larger systems of equations with 
2 
other endogenous variables of interest (see Carr-Hill and Stern, 1973). However, since police strength is 
included in the system of equations, these models often implicitly produce findings on the factors influencing 
police strength. 
When weak instruments are used that violate these assumptions, parameter estimates will be inconsistent and 
frequently biased. 
Much of the information presented in the last two paragraphs relies on my contributions to a recent chapter on 
the effects of police on crime (Eck and Maguire 2000). 
This is because current year police strength may have an effect on lagged values of crime through a common 
correlation with lagged police strength “which is not in the regression, and, thus, is in the error term” (Marvell 
and Moody, 1996:617). 
5 
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3SLS). Many of the studies using this method have been criticized numerous times for using poor 
instruments, and there is good reason to doubt the findings from many of them (Fisher and Nagin, 1978; 
Marvell and Moody, 1996; Nagin, 1992). An  additional 31 (41%) use single or distributed lag structures 
to deal with simultaneity. Finally eight sets of analyses (1  1%) use the Granger causality test to explore 
causal direction and determine the proper lag length. According to Marvell and Moody (1996), this is 
the best procedure for addressing the simultaneity between police and crime. 
2.2.2.  Summarizing the Results of  Prior Studies 
police expenditures are the most commonly used measures of police strength, accounting for the 
majority of studies.  Other measures include uniformed officers, patrol officers, detectives, and patrol 
units.  These measures are nearly always expressed as rates per unit population, though a handful of 
studies have used rates per unit area or raw levels.  Moreover, though these different measures of 
police strength are consistently treated as interchangeable, recent research shows that the choice of a 
measure is an important specification decision that affects the findings greatly (Chamlin and 
Langworthy, 1986; Snipes, 1993). 
or more of the theories discussed in section 2.1, others appear to have been selected as a matter of 
convenience rather than theory.  A quick look at table 2.1  reveals how difficult it is to summarize the 
results of these studies easily.  The tremendous number of  research designs, data sources, methods for 
addressing simultaneity, measures of police strength, independent variables, and inconsistent findings 
make it nearly impossible to spot trends in the findings very easily. 
Because the sheer volume of information in table 2.1 makes it difficult to weigh the evidence for 
the many explanations of police strength, table 2.2 lists the effects of each independent variable 
separately.  I have excluded from table 2.2 all 16 sets of analyses in which the researchers made no 
attempt to deal with the simultaneity between police and crime.  Even after dropping the studies with 
the most obvious flaws, there remain substantial variations in the quality of the studies.  Overall, after 
combining similar variables (such as mean and median family income), table 2.2 contains 89 separate 
variables.  Furthermore, to facilitate interpretation, I have made a crude attempt to classify each 
variable into seven broad dimensions, six of them in the external environment of the police 
organization, and one having to do with the organization itself.  The criminal environment contains 11 
separate variables having to do with general and specific categories of crime.  The demographic 
environment contains 13 variables having to do with the demographic makeup of the population.  The 
economic environment contains 20 variables having to do with the economic characteristics of the 
jurisdiction, including such items as the volume of local business, the tax base and other sources of 
revenue.  The political environment contains 5 variables having to do with the political structure or 
culture of the jurisdiction.  The socioeconomic environment contains 11 variables having to do with 
the socioeconomic features of the populace.  The “other” environment contains 14 variables unable to 
be otherwise classified, such as the presence of airports and parks, or the number of hotel rooms. 
Finally, the police organizational dimension contains 15 variables having to do with the structure and 
productivity of the agency, including arrests and clearances for various offenses.  This crude 
classification system demonstrates the many kinds of variables thought to influence police strength. 
table is useful for quantifying the appearance of different variables in studies and models explaining 
police strength.  Using this information, we can examine the frequency with which particular 
independent variables have been included in models predicting police strength.  In addition, we can 
weigh the strength of the evidence for any given independent variable.  Thus, the summary 
information in table 2.2 is a good resource for examining the evidence in favor of various explanations 
for police strength.  Even this format, however, makes it difficult to get a quick “snapshot” of the 
The dependent variables listed in table 2.1 vary widely.  Police officers, police employees, and 
The independent variables listed in table 2.1 also vary widely.  While many are drawn from one 
What can we learn from table 2.2?  Aside from demonstrating the enormity of the literature, this 
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excludes the 16 (out of 75 total) sets of analysis that made no attempt to deal with the simultaneity 
between police and crime. For each variable, the table lists the number of separate sets of analyses in 
which the variable is presented.  In addition, for each set of analyses, we conclude that the effect of the 
variable is zero if fewer than half of the coefficients are significant, positive if half or more are 
positive and significant, and negative if half or more are negative and significant.  This results in a 
rather simple snapshot of the effects of these 15 variables. 
I set out in this chapter to determine whether it was possible to extract a set of robust findings 
from this large and fragmented body of research.  Despite numerous hurdles, table 2.3 represents my 
best efforts to that end. The 15 explanatory variables in table 2.3 are the ones most frequently 
represented in models of police strength.  For instance, three of the variables with the highest 
percentage of positive effects are the lag value of police employees, police expenditures, and 
government revenue.  Thus, places that are wealthier or provide greater resource allocations to police 
agencies have higher levels of police strength.  This is a rather banal finding, and is to be expected. 
The only other two variables with positive findings in at least half the studies are murder and auto 
theft.6 Four other categories of crime (violent crime, property crime, total crime, and robbery) have 
positive effects in at least 40% but less than 50% of the studies.  While this suggests that crime is an 
important variable in the production of police strength, the lack of consistency needs to be addressed. 
It may be that mis-specification in other parts of the model (such as the measurement of police 
strength or the types of data used) are responsible for the inconsistencies.  Nearly half of the studies 
that included percent nonwhite as an explanatory variable found a positive effect on police strength, 
though 15% also found a negative effect.  This suggests that racial conflict explanations for police 
strength are worth further examination.  On the other hand, as some researchers have noted, the effect 
may be nonlinear, which may account for some of the inconsistency in these findings.  Jackson and 
Carroll (1981) and others have found some evidence that the size of threatening populations has a 
curvilinear (quadratic) effect; that communities with either a small or large percentage of minorities 
may not feel “threatened,” while those with a moderate proportion of minorities may respond to 
feelings of social threat by increasing the size of their police  force^.^  Population and average family 
income each have a relatively small positive effect on police strength, with the majority of studies 
finding a zero effect.  Nevertheless, there are enough studies reporting positive effects to suggest that 
larger and wealthier communities may be more heavily policed.  Finally, the presence of riots had a 
positive association with police strength in 1/3 of the studies examined. 
Only two of the variables listed in table 2.3 demonstrate strong evidence for null or negative 
effects on police strength.  The number of motor vehicles, which is presumably used as a proxy for 
police workload, has been found to have no effect in 5 of 6 studies. The density of a community 
(population per unit area) is the only variable with convincing evidence of a negative effect on police 
strength. It was included in 12 studies, with 5 finding a negative effect and 6 finding no effect. 
Overall, even though some of the findings in table 2.3 are readily interpretable, they demonstrate a 
general lack of consistency that is probably due to the methodological issues discussed earlier: poor 
model specification, poor measurement, and a failure to adequately address simultaneity. 
independent variables appearing most frequently in studies of police strength. Like table 2.2, this table 
Interestingly, both of these variables have very high reporting rates. This might suggest the possibility that 
crime trends influence police strength, but that these effects are not captured as well for other categories of crime 
with lower reporting rates.  At this point there is no evidence to this effect, but this is a testable hypothesis that is 
worth examining in future research. 
Furthermore, as Greenberg and colleagues (1985) have found, the effect may be even more complex. Their 
research found that percent nonwhite has stronger linear and quadratic effects on police strength in the south and 
from 1950-1970 (but not from 1970-1980). 
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Table 2.2.  Independent variables used to explain police strength 
Dimensions  Independent variables  # Coefficients  # Studiesk  Findings 
Criminal Environment  Assault  29  3  (0/14). (0/14). (+) 
.................................  Auto Theft  .........................  31  5  (+13/14), (+11/14), (+), (+I, (0)  ........................................ 
Burglary  ...  29  __  3  ...................  (+), (+9/14),  .  (+10/14)  _  ............................................................................. 
Larceny  28  3  (+5/13). 1+3/14). (+) 
..............................  ~ ..................................  "  -. 
............  1  1  (0)  ................  Major Crime 
Murder  76  6  (+6/6), (3/40)1,  (0), (+3/14), (+11/14), (+) 
....................................................................................................................................  .........................  ... 
.........................  ~ .........................................................  ..................................  ~  ......................................  .............................................. 
Property Crime  42  24  (+I, (O),  (+), (O),  (+2/8), (+I, (O),  (-2/2),  (O),  (+), (0/2), (0/2), (0/2), 
......................  (0/2), (O),  (0/2),  ..............................................................  (0/2), (-2/2),  (+2/2),  .  (+2/2), (+I, (+I, (+I, (+1/2)  ................................  ............................................................................................................................................. 
.....................................................................................................................................  Rapeb  62  ....................................................................................  5  (7/32)1, (+), (+),  ..........  (+1/14),  .- ........  (+5/14)  ..................................................................................... 
Robbery 
Total Crimec 
72  7  (0/2) (.1/2), (+9/14),  ...........................................  (+8/14), (+), (8/38)i, (0)-  .................................................................................................................  ._  ...................................................................................... 
115  24  (+9/15), (.1/2), (0/2),(.), (O),  (O),  (2/38)i, (01, (01, (.2/2), (+), (01, (O), 
(+11/16). (+9/9). (-9/9). (+). 1+6/6). (+). (0/2\. (+). (+\. (+). (+\ 
Violent Crirnea 
(O),  (01, (O),  (0) 
Demographic Environment  .............  Density  ................................................................................  ..................................................................................  27  12 ..........................  (Oh  .- ...........................  (.)! (O),  (01, (0).  (O),  (.2/2),  ~  (+), (O),  .......................................  (-4181, (.4/8), (->  ....................................................... 
Growth  2  2  (0).  I-) 
Median Age  1  1  (0) 
Median Education Level  ..................  1  .....................................  1  (.) 
Percent Over 65 Years Old  .  2  1  (.1/2) 
................................................................................................  ._ .............................................................................................................  ...........................................  ................................................  .......... 
.................  ...  .........  "  .............................................................................. 
......................................................................................  ..-  .........  ...................................  ............................................................................. 
Percent Nonwhitee  55  27  (.3/4), (-4141, (0)-  (0/2), (O),  (O),  (O),  (+2/4), (+), (+), (01, (0/2), (-2/2), 
(+2/2), (-21219 (+2/2)t (0/2),  (+Is  (+3/8), (+2/2), (01, (+),.(+), (+I, 
(+3/4), (+2/2), (+) 
"  ..............................  ..............................................................................................................  . 
Percent Italian  4  2  (+1/2). (.1/2) 
......  Percent  .__  Youngd  .  __  ....  -  4  3  (0): (+2/2)  "  .........  .............................................................. 
Percent White  2  1  (.1/2)  ............................... 
... Percent Urban  1  ~.  1  (+I  "  "  .  ..  ....... 
Percent  .-  Male  ....................  .........................  .........................  1  ...............................  1  (0)  ............................... 
Population  37  17  (+2/2), (.I, (+I, (+), (O),  (01, (0/2), (+1/2), (+1/2), (.I, (-2121,  (O), 
Region  7  5  (0/3),  (01, (O),  (+I 
........................................................................................................................... 
._  .........  .......................................  ..................................................  ~ .........  .......  ...... 
..........................  ...............................................  ................ 
........  _  - - ..  ~  (+2/8), (01, (+1/21,  ~  .-  (0/8), (+I  ~  ............................................  .__  .........................  _.  ............. 
Economic Environment  Average Firm Size  - ...  ...........  1  ...  1  .....................................................................................................................................  (+I  "  ........................................................................................................ 
Avg  ........  Annual Federal Aid .............................  ...................................  1  .......................................................................  1  (+I  .- ....................................................................  ........................................................................  ....._....... . 
Business Failure  2  2  ..(:),..  !+) 
............  Business  .....  District  _.  2  1  (+1/2)  ........ 
...............................................................................................................................  ................................................  ............................................................................................................. 
....................................................................................  .-  ................................................................................  -  .......  ................................................................................................. 
Consumer Price Index  2  1  (+2/2)  .-,  .......  _  .....  . ._ ..............  ......................  ........  .................................................................................................  ...........................................................................  ............................ 
Economic  .................  Inequality  ... ...........  18  2  (+9/9), (-9/9)  ..  "  _  ~ ..............................................................................................................................  ....................................................................................  ......................................................................................................................... 
GNPIGDP  5  2  (0).  (+4/4) 
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..............  Government Revenue  .  .......  -  ...........................................................................................................  14  7  (01, (+1/3),  (+3/3),  (+1/2), (+1/2),  .....  (0/2), (+I  ................................................................................................. 
..............................................  Government Budget/Expenditure  11"  --_-_  3  3  (.)*  (+I, (+)  ......................................................................................................................  -  ............................................  ................................................ 
.............  Median Home Value  ~  ....................  ~ -  ..........  -  . 1  1  (0)  .........  ..........................  ~  ._  .....  ........................................................................... 
Non.white/White  Median Income  2  2  (0).  (0) 
................  Poverty  1  1  (0) 
.............................................  Price of Private Goods  ............  1  1  (0) 
...........................................  Property Valuation  4  4  (+Iv  (+I*  (+)*  (+) 
.  Property Tax  3  3  (+)?  (+), (+) 
.....................  Retail  .- Sales  1  1  (0) 
................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................>￿ 
...........................................................................................................................................................  ................................................................ 
..........................................................  ............................................................................................................................................................................. 
................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................ª￿ 
..........................................  .  ................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................￿￿ 
Revenue  1  1  (+) 
Surplus Value  8  2  (+4/4),  (+4/4) 
Tax  2  2  (+), (+I 
Unemployment  20  5  (01, (O/l4), (0/3), (0131, (0) 
..........  ....................................................  ".-l...ll.lll_l_ll.--------.-I..."  ..................................................................................................................................................................  .................................................................... 
.........................................................................................  ........................................................................................  ............................................................................................................................  ._ ...................................................................................................................... 
Other Environment  ..  Airports/Presence  ..............................................................................................  of Parks  2  1  (0/2)  ............................................................................................... 
.............  Area  ....................................................  ..I  4  4  (.)?  (Oh . (.) 
.- ...............  Household Activity Ratio .........  1  1  (+)  ............................................................................................................................ 
.............................  Injury Traffic  ....................................  Accidents  2  2  (O),  (0)  .......................................... 
............................................................................................................................................................. 
......................................................................................................................................................  ...................................................................................................................................................................... 
Hotel  ......................................  Rooms Per Acre  .......  ..  2  2  (+),  ..................................................................  ...  ......................................................................................................................................  ................................................................ 
........................................  ....................................................................................................................................................................  .....  -  .............. 
......................................................................................  ........................................................................................................  .- 
Manhattan  2  1  (+2/2') 
..  ...........................  ......  ..............  ............................  ......................  ........  .................  ....  .............................................. 
Public Transportation Use  "  ............  1  1  ....................  ~ ...........................  (0)  "....--".."....._I.  .................................................... 
Segregation  ..........................  8  2  (+1/4), (.1/4)  .........................  .....................  ......  ......... 
Street Miles  2  1  (+1/2) 
.................................................................................................................................................................................................  _.  ..  ........................................... 
.........  Union Initiative  1  1  (0)  ..................................................................  ............................................................................................................................................................................................................. 
Workers on Strike  1  1  (0) 
Police Organization  Arrests  ...........  _  .........................................................  7  -  ...............................................................................................  3  (01,  ~3),  ....................................  (013)  "  .................................  ..................................................................... 
.......  1  1  (+) -.  .......  ~ 
.  Contract  ~ .-  Agency  ............................  ~  2  2  (.Ig  c.1  ...................................................... 
.........  ...............  1  1  (+I  .......... 
.........................................................................  Assault Arrests 
.................... 
Calls for Service  1  1  (+I .  ....................... 
Clearance Rate  ....................  3  .....  2  (O), 
............................................................ 
-  ...............................................................................................................................................................  -.  ...........................................................................  ...................  . 
....................................................................................................................................................................................................  ....................... 
...........  Drug Arrests 
Murder Arrests  1  1  (0') 
............................................  ~  ........................................ 
._  .........................  .,  .-  ......................................................................  ..................................................................................................................................................... 
..........  (0)  ......................................  ."..ll.  ................................ 
Officers' Salary  2  2  (01, (+I  .......................................................................................................... 
1  .........................................................................................................................  1  ...........................................................................................................................  Nonwhite Arrests 
Police Employeesf  41  15  (+I, (01, (+8/8),  (+2/2),  (+2/2),  (+2/2),  (+2/2), (+2/2), (+), (+I, (+4/4), 
......................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 
.............  ...............................  ..................................................................................  ..................................................................................................................................................  .............................................  (+3/3),  (+;),  (+1/2), (+8/8) 
................... 
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.. Police Expenditures  ....  -. .  -  ..  26  ..........  ..........................................................  13  (+ID  (0/2),  (.), .......................................  (+), (+4/4),  (+),  ......  (+), (+)*  (0/3),  (O),  ... ._  .......................................................................  (01, (0)) 
Property Arrest  4  2  (012).  (+2/2) 
.... Robbery Arrest  ..  ......... _  ......  ...............  2  ._  2  ......................................  (Oh  (+)  ._  ........  ............................................................................... 
.................  Traffic Citation  ............... ._  ...  .....  ---  1  ..........................................  1  (+I  ^ .  -. ......  ............................................................. 
...................  Ford  - Presidency  .....  ................  -  ......... -.-  ...............  1 .-  ..........................................  1  (+)  -  ......  ......... .~  __  ~  .................................................. 
......................  Government Aid  ~  ...................  .- ........  2  . -  .................................................................................  2  (0)s (+I  ..... _  ..................................................................... 
.... 
Violent Arrest  4  2  (0/2),  (+2/2) 
Political Environment 
Mayor Thomoson Era  6  2  (.3/3).  (0/3) 
Republican Strength  -  1  1  (+I  .......................................................................................... 
Riot  17  6  (0).  (01, (o), (+), (4112)  1,  (+) 
Socioeconomic Environment  Average Family Incomeh  24  16  (+)! (+I, (+), (01, (+1/2),  (om,  (O), (-2/2),  (0/2),  (0/2),  (O), (+4/4),  (O), 
...............  ............. .-  ....... -  ........  -  .  .  .........  (+), (O),  ._  .....  (0)  ............  -  ............................................. 
..................  Average  ^ ....................  Monthly  ._  Earning  ......  .--  1  1  ....... ......... 
Average  ................  Annual  ..........  Income  -- -  ......................  .- ................  1  ..  1  ......................................................  (+I  ...  ................................................... 
Bank Debit  2  2  ...  -  - .-  .......  ................................................................  (.+ ,,...+:,  ......................................  --  ........................................................................................................................................ 
- ............  Inequality'  .- .........  ^  -  .... --_-  ..........  9  5  (0121,  ..............  (0/2),  (0/2),  (0/2),  ........  (.>  .......... 
..  2  ....  (om,  (.)  ..............................  Percent Residents Owing  "  Homes  3  ~ 
........................................................................................................  (2  ..............................................  ........................................................................................................ 
...............................................................  Percent Middle Class  .-  .......  .....  .  -  3  2  (.I, (212)  - ..  ......................................................................................... 
Percent Low Income  ^  4  2  (+2/2),  .  (.2/2)  .................................... 
...................................................... 
......................................................................  .-  ._  ......................................................................... 
Home Relief  4  .......  1  (+2/4)  .......  ........  -  --  .- .....  "  -  ~ ............................................................................  .................. 
........................................................................  -.  "  ~  __  ................................................................................. 
....... 
Percent Professional  1  1 
............................................................................................................................................. 
............................  ......................  ...................... 
Percent Blue Collar  1  1  (.) 
Notes 
(a)  Violent Crime includes Personal Crime. 
(b)  Rape includes Rape Assaults. 
(c)  Total Crime includes Crime and Reported Crime. 
(d)  Percent Young includes Percent Young Males, Percent aged 15.30, and Percent under 21. 
(e)  Percent Nonwhite includes Percent Black and Percent Minority. 
(f)  Police Employees includes Police Size.  In  each of  the sets of findings reported in this row, the lag value of police employees was used in an equation predicting the current value. 
(9)  Police Expenditures includes Police Wages and Patrolman Wages.  Of the 13  sets of findings reported in  this row, six included the lag value of police expenditures in an equation predicting the current 
value and seven included police expenditures as a control in equations predicting the number of  officers or employees. 
(h)  Mean Family Income includes Mean Income. Median Family Income and Income. 
(i)  Inequality includes Income Inequality. 
(j)  Direction of effects not reported. 
(k)  For the purposes of this table, a single research project or journal article might contain more than one "study" if it: (1) reports results from different samples, (2) uses two or more vastly different 
methodologies (e.g.,  cross-sectional  or longitudinal), or (3) estimates models for different dependent or sets of  independent variables, 
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Independent variables  # Studies  +  0 
Percent Nonwhite  27  48%  37%  15% 
Property Crime  24  42%  50%  8% 
.................  Violent Crime  29  48%  45%  7%  ...................  ................  .............  .........................................  .....  .- ..............  ............................... 
.............................................................  ............................................................................................  .  ...............  ...............  ............................. 
........ Total Crimea  ....  24  46%  33%  17%  ...............................................  ....  .......................  .....................  ...  .......  ...................  .............. 
Population  17  41%  41%  18% 
Average Family Income  16  38%  56%  6% 
_ Lag Police Employeesb  ^.__  ..  .  ~ ....  15  .........  ...  93%  ...  7%  7%  .........  ._ 
Police Expenditures  13  54%  38%  8% 
Density  ..  .  12  8%  50%  42%  ..................................  ...  ... 
Robberya  7  43%  29%  14% 
Government Revenue  7  57%  43%  0% 
Motor Vehicles  6  17%  83%  0% 
Murdera  6  50%  33%  0% 
Riota  6  ..  33%  ...  50%  . -  .  .-  0%  ........................... 
Auto Theft  5  80%  20%  0% 
Notes 
(a)  One finding (direction of effect) not reported. 
(b)  One study reported both a  negative and a positive effect. 
(c)  For the purposes of this table, a single research project or journal article might contain more than one “study” if it: (1) 
reports results from different samples, (2) uses two or more vastly different methodologies (e.g., cross-sectional  or 
longitudinal),  or (3) estimates models for different dependent or sets of independent variables. 
2.3.  DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
Research on police strength has not progressed in an incremental and orderly fashion, though 
certainly some improvements have occurred.  Careful, meticulous studies are rare, but when they 
occur they frequently make important substantive contributions.  Snipes (1993), for instance, found 
that the effect of threatening populations varies by time period and by the measure of police strength 
used: either size or expenditures.  While the size of the black population had a significant positive 
effect on police expenditures in two time-series equations containing data from 1904-1957, further 
analysis revealed that this effect was primarily concentrated from1918 to 1933. Moreover, from 1918 
to 1933, the size of the Italian population was considered more threatening and had a significant 
positive effect on police expenditures.  This is the first piece of  evidence in this line of research to 
suggest an “ethnic succession” explanation for variations in police expenditures.  Snipes also found 
that these findings were different for police size.  He concluded that “until now, scholars have 
assumed that police size and police expenditures are interchangeable measures of police strength.  It is 
possible that police size is determined more by the police organization, whereas police expenditures 
are mostly determined by city government” (1993:27). 
In another fascinating study, Hakim (1979) and his colleagues estimate a simultaneous equation 
model of police strength and crime rates.  They find that crime affects police expenditures, but that 
crime is affected by a number of exogenous variables including police expenditures in neighboring 
communities. This effect propagates through the system of equations so that expenditures in a given 
community affect expenditures in neighboring communities (through crime-  with stronger effects 
through property crime than violent crime).  They conclude that “a $1 increase in police expenditure 
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given community” (p. 21 1). They interpret this as evidence of a “spillover” of crime and police in 
neighboring communities.  Furthermore, this finding suggests the need to control for spatial 
autocorrelation in police expenditure models. 
strength are no longer useful.  As late as 1986, researchers were still using bivariate and partial 
correlations on cross-sectional data to draw inferences about police strength (Slovak, 1986). As late as 
1994, researchers were still ignoring two decades of commentary on the consequences of haphazard 
identification restrictions (Niskanen, 1994).  As Marvel1 and Moody (1996) and numerous other 
researchers have pointed out, the factors that structure police strength in the United States are 
extremely sensitive to specification error (Chamlin and Langworthy, 1996). They demonstrate how 
subtle changes in statistical modeling strategies can have an enormous effect on the findings.  Making 
further progress in this line of research will require meticulous studies that build carefully on prior 
research, testing new model specifications, introducing new controls and methodologies, and using 
new and better data sources. 
with a rather weak and inconsistent set of findings.  Nalla and his colleagues (1997: 140) offer at least 
one potential remedy: 
...  although  quantitative  analysis  captures  some  dimensions  of  those  forces  which 
shape policing, qualitative assessments  and data may further clarify police  growth 
patterns.  For instance, we need further research on the actors’ interpretive processes 
and the organizational contexts in which they make decisions about increases in police 
personnel and budgets. 
One thing that is clear from this line of research is that simplistic analyses of the causes of police 
After three decades of research on the causes of police strength in the United States, we are left 
Careful qualitative research may complement the large body of quantitative research reviewed in 
this report.  Collecting this kind of information will shed new insights about the forces shaping the 
growth and decline of American police organizations. 
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A Survey-Based Assessment of 
Factors Causing Changes in Sworn 
Force Size:  Examining the 
Perceptions of Police 
Christopher S. Koper and Gretchen E.  Moore 
3.1.  INTRODUCTION 
Chapter Two reviewed prior research on the determinants of police strength.  This chapter 
compliments Chapter Two in two ways.  First, we examine factors that have influenced changes in 
police strength during the late 1990s, a period of particular interest to federal policymakers who 
invested billions of dollars in expanding the nation’s police forces through the Community Oriented 
Policing Services (COPS) program.  Between 1994 and 1999, federal authorities funded upwards of 
60,000 new officers for state and local law enforcement agencies.  In this chapter, we examine the role 
of grant money and other factors in fueling police growth during the late 199Os, while also examining 
potentially offsetting forces that slowed police growth and/or contributed to reductions in police 
strength. 
strength both methodologically and substantively. Chapter Two’s review of prior studies on the 
determinants of police strength demonstrated that these factors are not well understood. As was 
discussed in that chapter, scholars have used three theoretical frameworks to explain variation in 
police strength, measured in terms of officers or expenditures.  Rational public choice theory links 
variation in police strength to variables such as crime and population size, which reflect demand for 
police services.  Conflict theory states that governments increase their police forces in response to 
growth in populations that dominant groups deem to be threatening.  Threatening populations may be 
defined in racial terms (e+,  non-white groups) or in economic terms (e.g., the poor and unemployed). 
Finally, organizational theory stresses internal organizational factors that influence the size of police 
agencies.  Scholars have not developed this theory as fully as the others, generally relying on the 
notion that change in bureaucracies tends to be incremental.  Hence, the size of today’s police force 
should be a good predictor of tomorrow’s police force. 
However, Chapter Two’s review of over 50 empirical studies on the determinants of police 
strength showed that variables derived from these theories have not proven to be consistent predictors 
of police strength.  With the exception of lagged values of sworn officers (i.e., using the size of 
yesterday’s police force to predict the size of today’s police force), virtually nothing has been shown 
to predict police staffing as predicted on a consistent basis.  Chapter Two’s review attributed the 
mixed findings of prior research in large measure to a number of methodological points, such as 
variation in the definition of police strength (i.e., officers or expenditures) across studies, poor and/or 
inconsistent model specification, and the complexities involved in disentangling the mutual effects 
The second aim of the chapter is to extend the existing research on the determinants of police 
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that arises in many correlational studies of crime and police strength). 
While we cannot attempt to resolve all of these issues in one study, the research presented in this 
chapter attempts to modestly extend the literature on this topic in a number of ways.  Building on 
Chapter Two’s recommendation for further research into the interpretations and assessments of actors 
who make decisions about police strength, this chapter utilizes data from a national police survey to 
examine police officials’ perceptions about factors influencing sworn force levels in their agencies. 
Whereas prior studies have generally treated the decision-making process behind changes in police 
strength as a “black box,” using aggregate-level correlations between police strength and other factors 
to make indirect inferences about the process, the use of survey data allows us to tap into the 
perceptions of people who have insight into the actual process by which staffing levels are set. 
In the process, we also examine whether the determinants of police strength are similar or 
different for police agencies of different sizes.  Prior studies have employed a wide range of analysis 
units, ranging from national police counts to subdivisions within agencies, and this may partially 
explain the mixed findings of prior research. 
Finally, we consider the possibility that the factors leading to growth in police forces differ from 
those leading to decline in police forces.  To elaborate, consider the relationship between violent crime 
and police strength.  As shown in Chapter Two, the results of prior studies assessing this relationship 
have been pretty evenly split between those finding a positive relationship and those finding no 
statistically meaningful relationship.  A few studies even showed an inverse relationship.  If one 
assumes that crime is related positively to police strength, this implies that increases in crime cause 
increases in police strength and, conversely, that decreases in crime cause reductions in police 
strength.  An alternative hypothesis, in contrast, is that crime tends to affect police strength more 
clearly when crime increases. Faced with rising levels of crime and citizen fear, policymakers may 
choose to boost police strength.  Once the new officers are on board, however, organizational inertia 
may tend to hold the agency at its new, higher level even if crime begins to decline (i.e., the 
organization will attempt to maintain its higher resource levels).  Political pressure may also sustain 
the agency at its higher level, particularly if the growth in police is perceived to have reduced crime. 
A reduction in crime might eventually cause shrinkage in the police force, but the effect may tend to 
be more gradual.  If this reasoning is correct, it may help to explain the conflicting findings of past 
research, especially in studies examining changes in police strength over time.  With these possibilities 
in mind, we separately examine factors perceived by police to be associated with growth and decline 
in police strength. 
3.2.  DATA AND METHODS 
The data for this study come from the Police Hiring and Retention (H&R) survey, a telephone 
survey conducted during the summer of 2000 with a nationally representative sample of 1,270 police 
agencies of all sizes and types.  The H&R sample is described in the Methodological Appendix.  As 
discussed in Chapter One and the Methodological Appendix, the H&R survey was used to collect to 
data on a wide range of police staffing issues.  One portion of the survey was dedicated to an 
exploration of factors affecting recent staffing changes in the sampled agencies.  During the course of 
the interviews, project staff identified agencies that had experienced increases or decreases of five 
percent or more in sworn officers from 1996 through 1999 and asked respondents for these agencies 
about the role of several factors in causing these changes.* 
The 1996 sworn force levels are based on those reported by the agencies in earlier interviews conducted in the 
fall of  1996 (see the Methodological Appendix). 
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the chief.  Due to the myriad of organizational titles held by the respondents, we could not make a 
detailed assessment of the organizational positions of all the respondents.  Based on an informal 
examination, it appears that nearly 60% of the respondents were chief or deputy/assistant chief law 
enforcement officers.  About three-quarters of the respondents appeared to be top-level law 
enforcement officers, middle management officers @e., lieutenants and above), administrative 
assistants to chief law enforcement officers, or directors of various sorts. The remaining respondents 
held a variety of titles, such as sergeant, administrative or budget analyst, grant manager/coordinator, 
planning and research coordinator, and community policing supervisor.  In a few cases, the interviews 
were conducted with municipal officials such as the mayor.  Overall, it seems reasonable to treat the 
respondents as a group who were knowledgeable about police budgets and staffing decisions. 
However, we should note a few points that may limit the generalizations that we can draw from 
the results.  As discussed in the last chapter, previous studies have measured police strength in a 
variety of ways (e.g., sworn officers, police expenditures).  Further, some studies have emphasized 
changes over time in police strength, while others have emphasized differences between places.  This 
study utilizes sworn officers as the measure of police strength? and our focus is on describing changes 
over time in police strength at the agency level.  In addition, we focus on recent changes in agency size 
(years 1996 through 1999); therefore, some of the results may be particular to the context of recent 
years - a period of declining national crime rates, a strong economy, and plentiful federal money for 
police expansion - and may not generalize well to other time periods. 
Each respondent whose agency had grown or shrunk by 5% or more was asked to judge whether 
each of 11 different items had “little or no” influence, “some” influence, or “much” influence on the 
staffing change.”  A number of the items are similar to those tested in previous research:  crime, calls 
for service, population, and government revenue/fiscal conditions. However, the use of survey data 
enabled us to probe some of these dimensions of citizen demand in further detail than have other 
studies.  In particular, we asked about the distinct influences of crime and calls for service, demands 
from citizens’ groups, public reaction to dramatic, highly publicized crimes or crime sprees (e.g., 
school shootings) that may have shocked the community, and decisions by or changes in political 
leaders.’  I 
We also incorporated a number of items that have not been studied extensively but which seemed 
particularly relevant to the context of recent years:  the availability of grant money and qualified 
recruits, the acquisition of new technology, and changes in policing strategy.  Federal grant money for 
hiring new officers has been plentiful since the mid-1990s due to the enactment of the COPS program, 
the federal government’s effort to add 100,000 officers to the nation’s police forces.  As of May 1999, 
the federal government had provided grants for the hiring of approximately 61,000 officers (Koper and 
Roth 2000), a factor which has undoubtedly facilitated recent growth in policing. 
At the same time, there are some indications that police have begun to experience difficulty 
finding qualified recruits (Butterfield 2001 ;  Law Enforcement News 2000a), a development which, if 
real, may have inhibited growth or caused decline in some agencies.  This condition, which is also 
discussed elsewhere in this volume (see Chapter Four), would seem to be linked to the strong 
economy of recent years and has perhaps been aggravated by, among other things, retirements among 
Some budgetary information was collected from these agencies in a 1996 survey, but these figures were not 
updated in the H&R survey. 
lo These questions were not administered to agencies that changed as a result of merging with or separating from 
other law enforcement agencies. 
Some of these factors, most notably crime, are thought to both affect and be affected by police strength.  In 
this study, we focus on the former effects by examining police officials’ views of how marginal changes in these 
variables affect police staffing decisions. We did not ask the respondents to estimate any reciprocal effects that 
police staffing might have on the variables under study. 
II 
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have affected recent staffing trends in police agencies.  Between 1990 and 1997, for instance, growth 
in the use of in-field computers and terminals by local police departments ranged from 52% in 
agencies serving 250,000 or more residents to 850% in agencies serving fewer than 10,000 residents 
(Reaves and Goldberg 2000, p. 26).  The COPS program has also facilitated the adoption of new 
technology by police.  In addition to providing grants for hiring new officers, COPS has attempted to 
raise the level of policing in the United States with grants to improve officer productivity through the 
acquisition of technology and civilian hires.  Federal authorities had awarded about 40,000 officer 
equivalents through COPS grants for technology and civilians as of May 1999 (Koper and Roth 2000). 
As of mid-1998, about three-fourths of the officer equivalents awarded through these types of grants 
were linked to new technology.  In light of these developments, we inquired about the impact of 
technology acquisition on staffing levels based on the speculation that acquisition of new technology 
has made manpower allocation more effective, potentially slowing the need for growth in some 
agencies and making others more likely to reduce staff. 
adoption of community policing and zero tolerance (alternatively, quality of life or order maintenance 
policing) strategies among the nation’s police agencies.  By  1999, for example, 17% of all local police 
departments and a majority of those serving jurisdictions with populations of 50,000 or more persons 
had formal, written community policing plans (Hickman and Reaves 2001, p. 9).  Earlier survey 
research with a subsample of local agencies in the H&R survey found that large majorities of local 
agencies in large jurisdictions (i.e., those with 50,000 or more persons) were using problem solving, 
crime prevention, and community partnership tactics that are common to community policing (Roehl 
et al. 2000). Indeed, one of the major goals of the COPS program has been to encourage the adoption 
of community policing.  By the same token, nearly 40% of the agencies in the H&R survey adopted 
zero tolerance-style crackdowns on public order offenses between 1995 and 2000.  These and other 
strategy changes might place more strain on police, leading to the need for more officers. In some 
cases, changes in strategy might prove popular or unpopular with citizens, affecting political support 
and resources for police. 
Finally, we inquired about the contributions of changes in budgeted or authorized force levels to 
changes in staffing.  We used this item to get a sense of the extent to which observed staffing changes 
represented purposeful decisions by police or other public officials, as opposed to fluctuations caused 
by things like turnover, unexpected attrition, and/or delays in hiring and training new officers. 
Overall, the questionnaire items fit most clearly into the rational public choice perspective, 
generally reflecting demands on police and the availability of resources for policing.  Acquisition of 
new technology and changes in police strategy reflect internal organizational decisions and fit better 
into the organizational theory perspective, though these decisions may also be influenced by resource 
availability, demands for service, and political considerations.  The technology and strategy items 
enable us to go beyond the concept of inertia in examining organizational factors that may influence 
staffing, particularly during periods of innovation. 
However, some of the other items may lend themselves to more complex interpretations.  More 
specifically, citizens’ demands and decisions by political leaders may be affected by elements of racial 
or economic conflict.  For example, tension and fear arising from racial turnover in a community could 
conceivably lead to demands for more police protection.  In such a case, citizen demand would 
represent the mechanism through which racial conflict operates. 
study of this sort.  In the latter part of the analysis, however, we tentatively offer some indirect 
evidence on conflict-based explanations of police strength, investigating briefly whether reported 
The growing adoption of new technology by police departments is another development that may 
We inquired about the possible effects of changes in police strategy due largely to the growing 
We felt that our ability to examine conflict explanations of police strength was limited in a survey 
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to changes in police strength and assessing police officers’ views on whether such social changes 
affect citizens’ demands for police service. 
3.3.  RECENT PATTERNS OF  CHANGE IN THE SIZE OF POLICE AGENCIES 
In general, the study period was characterized more by police growth than by police decline.  As 
shown in table 3.1, a little over half of both large and small agencies grew during the study period (in 
the H&R survey design, large agencies consist of those serving jurisdictions with 50,000 or more 
persons, and small agencies consist of those serving jurisdictions with populations of fewer than 
50,000 persons).  The median increase was 13% in large agencies and 20% in small agencies.  About 
1 1  % of large agencies and almost 22% of small agencies decreased in size.  The median decreases 
were 14% and 15% for large and small agencies, respectively. 
Table 3.1.  Changes in sworn force size 
Large agencies  Small agencies 
Change in sworn force  (n=552)  (n=706) 
Force increased  51.5%  51.5% 
Force decreased  11.4%  21.6% 
Force remained same*  37.1%  26.9% 
.  ........ __  .........  ...  ................. - .- ........... 
.....  ...........................  ...........................................  ..................  .... 
....  Median increase**  13%  .  .-  ................  -  20% 
Median decrease**  14%  15% 
*  i.e..  agencies whose staffing levels remained constant or that changed by less than plus or minus 5%. 
)*.  Median increase calculated for agencies which increased by 5% or more.  Median decrease 
calculated for agencies which decreased by 52  or more. 
3.4.  FACTORS CAUSING INCREASES AND DECREASES IN SWORN FORCE 
STRENGTH, 1996-1999 
Tables 3.2 and 3.3 display the results of the staffing influence questions for large and small 
agencies that grew during the reference period.  For each item, the tables show the percentages of 
respondents who judged the items to have had, respectively, little or no influence, some influence, and 
much influence on changes in staffing.  In each table, the items are listed in rank order based on their 
average scores on a three-point scale (l=little or no influence, 2=some influence, 3=much influence). 
Most of the items had at least some influence on agency growth for roughly half or more of both 
large and small agencies.  Overall, respondents for large and small agencies ranked the items quite 
similarly.  For both groups, the four most important factors influencing agency growth were the 
availability of grant money, changes in the budgeted or authorized force, levels of crime and calls for 
service, and changes in population.  The availability of grant money appeared to be the single most 
important factor affecting agency growth.  Grant money ranked first for large agencies and second for 
small agencies, and it was the item most likely to have had much influence on staffing growth for both 
groups of agencies.  Note also that while respondents ranked levels of crime and calls for service 
relatively highly, they gave relatively little weight to sensational crimes, perhaps in part because 
relatively few jurisdictions experienced such crimes. 
items among both large and small agencies, each having much influence on staffing changes for 
Decisions by or changes in political leaders and changes in police strategy were mid-ranking 
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influence on staffing changes for half or more of the agencies in each size category. 
qualified recruits, and the acquisition of new technology ranked low on each list, having little or no 
Table 3.2.  The perceived influence of  selected factors on  increases in police staffing: 
Large agencies which grew from 1996 to 1999 (n=270) 
Average 
Little / none  Some  Much  score 
Availability of grant money  14.8%  28.4%  56.8%  2.42 
Change in agency's budgeted or authorized force  22.5%  38.0%  39.2%  2.17 
Levels of crime of volume of calls for service  21.5%  42.0%  36.5%  2.15 
~ ....  ~  ~  .. 
. 
Changes in population size in  your jurisdiction  35.9%  31.1%  33.0%  1.97 
Decision by elected officials or changes in your jurisdiction's  35.1%  36.7%  28.2%  1.93 
political leadership 
Change of police strategy  37.4%  41.1%  21.5%  1.84 
Demands from business groups, citizen activists, or  40.9%  44.3%  14.7%  1.74 
community groups 
Changes in tax revenues or fiscal constraints  45.5%  38.9%  15.6%  1.70 
~ 
..............................................................................  ~ ....... 
_____________  ~  ~  ~  __ 
...  ~  ~  ~  .. .  .. 
Acquisition of new technology  50.8%  33.6%  15.6%  1.65 
Availability of qualified recruits  56.4%  27.4%  15.9%  1.59 
Dramatic, highly visible crime or crime sprees  61.8%  28.4%  9.8%  1.48 
-. .  .  -.  ,  ....  ..... 
~  .. 
0 Table 3.3.  The perceived influence of selected factors on increases in police staffing: 
Small agencies which grew from 1996  to 1999 (n=340) 
Average 
Little / none  Some  Much  score 
Levels of crime of volume of calls for service  22.3%  37.8%  39.9%  2.18 
Availability of grant money  34.4%  23.1%  42.5%  2.08 
....................................................................................  I  "  ~ 
Change in agency's budgeted or authorized force  3  1.4%  39.8%  28.7%  1.97 
Changes in population size in your jurisdiction  42.8%  32.8%  23.7%  1.81 
Decision by elected officials or changes in your jurisdiction's  52.4%  24.5%  23.0%  1.70 
political leadership 
..................................................................................................  ~  ~  ~ 
~  " 
Change of  police strategy  49.9%  32.3%  17.8%  1.68 
Changes in tax revenues or fiscal constraints  52.7%  32.5%  14.8%  1.62 
Acquisition of new technology  58.0%  31.3%  10.6%  1.53 
~  "  ~  -  - . 
-.  ....-  . 
Demands from business groups, citizen activists, or  60.0%  31.0%  8.9%  1.49 
community groups 
Dramatic, highly visible crime or crime sprees  64.2%  25.3%  10.5%  1.46 
~ 
Availability of qualified recruits  67.1%  23.0%  10.0%  1.43 
Interviewers did not inquire about the specific types of strategy changes that influenced sworn force levels; 
consequently, the responses may reflect a wide variety of strategy changes. Elsewhere in the survey, however, 
interviewers inquired about the agencies' use of community policing and zero tolerance (alternatively, order 
maintenance or quality of life) policing.  Supplemental analyses suggest that zero tolerance strategies may 
necessitate staffing increases more often than other forms of community policing.  Almost 78%  of respondents in 
expanding agencies that adopted order maintenance initiatives between 1995 and 2000 reported that a change in 
strategy influenced staffing trends.  In contrast, only 43%  of growing agencies that adopted community policing 
between 1995 and 2000 indicated that a change of police strategy had at least some influence on staff expansion. 
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similarity in the way large and small agencies viewed the influence of these factors.  In general, the 
questionnaire items had less influence on police reduction than on police expansion.  Most items were 
judged to have had little or no influence on staffing reductions by 50% or more of respondents from 
declining agencies. 
conditions, and the availability of qualified recruits (or lack thereof) ranked as the top four items for 
both groups.  Roughly 20% or more of  respondents in each group ranked these items, as well as 
political decisions and turnover, as having had much influence on staffing changes.  The high ranking 
of grant money suggests that the absence of grant money (or the inability to obtain grant funds) 
facilitated staff reductions in some agencies while the availability of grant money probably slowed the 
rate of decline in other agencie~.'~  One notable difference between the agencies was that crime had a 
relatively stronger role in facilitating, or slowing, decline in large agencies than in small agen~ies.'~ 
Changes in budgeted or authorized force levels, the availability of grant money, changes in fiscal 
Table 3.4.  The perceived influence of selected factors on reductions in police staffing: 
Large agencies which declined from 1996 to 1999 (n=63) 
Average 
Little / no  Some  Much  score 
Change in agency's budgeted or authorized force  41.8%  32.2%  25.9%  1.84 
Availability of grant money  47.2%  26.7%  26.0%  1.79 
Changes in tax revenues or fiscal constraints  49.9%  25.2%  24.9%  1.75 
...................................  ...  ........................................................  -- ..  ... 
Availability of qualified recruits  46.3%  33.4%  20.3%  1.74 
Levels of crime of volume of calls for service  55.1  %  21.4%  23.5%  1.68 
Decision by elected officials or changes in your jurisdiction's  57.1%  21.5%  21.5%  1.64 
political leadership 
..............  ..  .. 
..............................................................................................................................................................  .....................  ..  .................  . 
Acquisition of new technology  63.1%  24.5%  12.3%  1.49 
Change of police strategy  58.0%  36.6%  5.3%  1.47 
-.  ...........  .........................................................................  ................................................................................................................  .......... 
Demands from business groups, citizen activists, or 
community groups 
66.1%  21.9%  11.9%  1.46 
- Changes in population  .  size in your jurisdiction  .  .  67.2%  20.9%  11.9% ...  1.45 
Dramatic, highly visible crime or crime sprees  72.0%  21.1%  6.8%  1.35 
l3 A cautionary note on interpreting the questionnaire results is that it is possible that some of the factors under 
study may have caused changes in staffing or slowed the rate of staffing changes. In general, it seems that we 
can make reasonable intuitive judgments about the nature of the effects, but the data do not permit us to clearly 
disentangle these possibilities. 
Respondents were also given the opportunity to offer other reasons for the increases or decreases in their 
agencies.  Several issues emerged from these verbatim responses, including the following: jurisdictional or 
geographical changes, salary issues, particularly the inability of some agencies to offer a competitive salary to 
new recruits; the offering of new services (sometimes linked to community policing); high quantities of retirees; 
and discrepancies in the way people were tallied from year to year. 
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@  Small agencies which declined from 1996 to 1999 (n=146) 
Average 
Little / no  Some  Much  score 
Availability of  grant money  52.5%  23.3%  24.2%  1.72 
Change in agency's budgeted or authorized force  57.7%  17.0%  25.2%  1.67 
Availability of  qualified recruits  56.6%  22.1%  21.3%  1.65 
.  .-  -  . 
_.  ................  ...  ..........................  _  .......  _  ..... 
Changes in tax revenues or fiscal constraints  58.5%  20.2%  21.3%  1.63 
Decision by elected officials or changes in  your jurisdiction's  58.6%  21.1%  20.2%  1.62 
political leadership 
.  .....  .....  .......  ...  ._  ...  __  .......... 
Changes in population size in  your jurisdiction  66.8%  18.5%  14.6%  1.48 
Change of police strategy  58.6%  34.9%  6.3%  1.48 
Acquisition of new technology  72.2%  18.3%  9.6%  1.37 
..__  ___  ....... 
.....  ...................................................................................................  ...  .-  ..  ___ 
Levels of crime of volume of calls for service  73.4%  20.3%  6.2%  1.33 
Demands from business groups, citizen activists, or  77.9%  19.0%  3.0%  1.25 
community groups 
.....  .  ...  ........ 
Dramatic, highly visible crime or crime sprees  79.4%  17.0%  3.5%  1.24 
Based on the perceptions of  police, therefore, it seems that the most and least important factors 
causing recent staffing changes were similar for large and small agencie~.'~  At the same time, 
however, the results suggest that there were some notable differences in the factors causing expansion 
and decline in police agencies. 
To illustrate the differences more starkly, table 3.6 compares the perceived influence of each 
factor on large increases and large decreases in police agencies.  We defined large increases as those 
greater than the median increase for all growing agencies.  Likewise, we defined large decreases as 
those greater than the median decrease among agencies in decline.  All of the factors we investigated 
had statistically different effects on police growth and decline, though the measures of association in 
the far right column show that most of these differences were modest in magnitude (measured on a 
scale of zero to one). 
The most dramatic difference was that crime and calls for service played a much larger role in 
causing police agencies to grow than in causing them to decline.  To illustrate, respondents in 46.8% 
of agencies experiencing large increases in size felt that crime and calls for service had much influence 
on their agency's change in size. The same was true among only 5.6% of respondents in agencies 
experiencing large staff reductions.  Even among those agencies experiencing decreases in both size 
and crime (n=75 for the full sample), 77% reported that crime and calls for service had little or no 
influence on the agency's change in size.I6 Less than 4% of these agencies reported that crime and 
calls for service had much influence. 
To further explore similarities and differences between large and small agencies, we conducted chi-square 
tests of the relationships between agency size and the perceived influence of the survey items (the tests are not 
shown in the text but are like those shown in table 3.6, which contrasts expanding and shrinking agencies). 
Though sometimes statistically significant, contingency coefficients showed that the relationships between 
agency size and the perceived influence of the survey items were small in magnitude. For expanding agencies, 
the largest association was 0.09 (for the grant money item) on a 0 to  1 scale. For declining agencies, the largest 
contingency coefficient was 0.1 15 (for crime and calls for service).  Overall, therefore, it seems that these factors 
had quite comparable influences on staffing in large and small agencies. 
The change in crime measure is based on respondents' perceptions as measured by a five point scale (increased 
a lot, increased a little, no change, decreased a little, decreased a lot).  Most respondents in this group reported 
modest decreases in crime. 
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(n’s=302 agencies with large increases in size and 11  5 agencies with large decreases in size) 
little / none  Some  Much  Strength of 
Decrease  Increase  Decrease  Increase  Decrease  Increase  assoc.* 
Levels of crime or volume of calls  70.8%  19.8%  23.5%  33.4%  5.6%  46.8%  ,458 
for service 
Dramatic, highly visible crime  72.5%  56.6%  23.5%  28.7%  4.0%  14.7%  ,175 
...I......-....._.--_-._  ...............................  ..  ......................................... 
Decision by elected officials or  61.8%  48.5%  21.5%  27.4%  16.7%  24.1%  ,122 
Demands from business and  80.8%  58.6%  17.5%  30.0%  1.8%  11.4%  .221 
political changes 
citizen groups 
-  -  .  .. ..  , 
Availability of grant money  46.8%  33.2%  18.4%  26.2%  34.8%  40.5%  ,131 
jurisdiction 
.......................................................  ~  ....- 
Change in population size in  70.9%  47.7%  17.0%  31.0%  12.0%  21.3%  ,210 
Change in tax revenue / fiscal  65.5%  51.9%  13.8%  36.0%  20.7%  12.1%  ,224 
constraints 
Change in agency’s budgeted or  60.5%  32.5%  17.0%  32.2%  22.5%  35.4%  ,254 
authorized force 
Availability of qualified recruits  62.0%  70.1%  14.6%  19.2%  23.5%  10.7%  ,166 
~ 
Acquisition of new technology  65.7%  54.0%  20.2%  34.9%  14.1%  11.1%  .144 
Change in police strategy  59.9%  49.9%  31.2%  33.4%  8.8%  16.7%  ,115 
*  The associations were measured with contingency coefficients, nonparametric measures of association which vary between 0 and 1 
(used here because the data do not have interval or ratio level measurement).  Chi-square tests of association showed all contingency 
coefficients to be significant at pe.05 with the exceptions of the elected officiaVpolitical decisions item (p=.05)  and the police strategy 
item (p=.07). 
These findings lend support to the hypothesis stated in the introduction -  rising or steady rates of 
crime and calls for service may tend to prompt expansion of police forces (conditional on the effects of 
other causal factors), but the potential impact of declining crime rates might often be mitigated by 
organizational inertia and the political difficulties of reducing police forces.  Similarly, note that 
demands by citizens’ groups and the reverberations of sensational crimes, though not ranked as very 
powerful influences on police staffing in general, were about three and a half to six times as likely to 
have had much influence on the growing agencies in table 3.6 than on the declining agencies. 
Changes in budgeted or authorized force levels, to provide another example, were leading causes of 
both growth and decline in police agencies, but they were about twice as likely to have some or much 
influence on staffing increases than on staffing reductions (see table 3.6). Thus, in general, demand- 
related variables may have stronger effects on police expansion than on police reduction.  On the other 
hand, variables reflecting the availability of resources for policing (e.g., grant money, government 
revenues/fiscal conditions, the availability of qualified recruits) may tend to have more equal effects 
on increases and decreases in staffing or to have larger effects on reductions in force. 
3.5.  RACIAL / ECONOMIC CONFLICT AND POLICE GROWTH 
Racial and economic conflict perspectives state that the dominant racial and economic groups in a 
community will tend to increase levels of formal social control (e.g., deploying more police) in 
response to perceived threats posed by, respectively, other racial groups and economically 
marginalized groups.  As noted earlier, we felt that our ability to test these theories with survey data 
was limited.  Asking respondents directly about the impact of economic and, especially, racial change 
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undertake a detailed evaluation of these theories.  However, we did conduct some tentative, indirect 
inquiries into these issues. 
First, respondents were asked whether there had been much change in the raciavethnic 
composition of their jurisdiction since 1995. In addition, they were asked to assess whether economic 
conditions had changed for the better or the worse since 1995. Though we do not have explicit 
measures of the magnitude of racial or economic changes, these items convey the perceptions of social 
change held by key actors in police agencies.  Therefore, the responses give us an indication of 
whether people in the jurisdiction regarded social changes as meaningful.  In the section below, we 
examine the bivariate relationships between these perceived social changes and changes in the size of 
police agencies. 
A second test was based on the hypothesis that racial and economic conflict might influence 
police strength through multiple mechanisms.  One mechanism is that reported crimes and calls for 
service might rise with racial turnover and economic decline.  During periods of social change, fear 
and distrust might rise, lessening citizens’ tolerance for minor crime and disorder while also eroding 
informal social controls in the community.  This pattern would put more pressure on formal 
institutions of social control, including the police.  To test this notion, we asked police to judge the 
impact of several factors on citizens’ demands for police service. The list included items reflecting 
racial change and economic conditions. 
3.5.1.  Perceptions of Racial and Economic Change and 
Changes in the Size of Police Agencies, 1996-1999 
in jurisdictions experiencing racial change increased in size, as did 53% of agencies in jurisdictions 
without racial change.  Small jurisdictions with racial change were somewhat less likely to have 
experienced police growth and somewhat more likely to have experienced a reduction in police (table 
3.7). Though not a statistically significant difference (chi-square p level = .2), large jurisdictions 
experiencing racial change were somewhat more likely to have an increase in police and less likely to 
have a decrease in police than were places with no racial change.18 The pattern in large agencies does 
not appear to have been linked to crime trends:  virtually identical proportions of large agencies 
reported crime increases (based on respondents’ perceptions) in jurisdictions with and without racial 
turnover (18% and 19%, respectively). 
For the sample overall, racial change was not related to police growth.”  About 47% of agencies 
Table 3.7.  Changes in police force size by racial change of jurisdiction and agency size* 
Racial change  No racial change 
Large (n=207)  Small (n=180)  Large (n=341)  Small (n=523) 
Increase in force  55.3%  45.9%  49.8%  52.9% 
No change in force  36.3%  29.0%  37.2%  26 4% 
Decrease in force  8.4%  25.1%  13.1%  20.7% 
Our analysis assumes that racial change in any direction (Le., an increasing proportion of non-whites, an 
17 
increasing portion of whites, or a change in the distribution of the non-white population) may create tensions that 
could lead to police growth. 
Examination of the mean rates of change in jurisdictions with and without racial turnover revealed no 
consistent pattern, and the results were sensitive to the inclusion or exclusion of outlier cases.  The median rates 
of change for small jurisdictions with and without racial change were 6%  and5%, respectively.  For large 
jurisdictions, the corresponding numbers were 7% and 5%. 
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and compared those in places experiencing racial change to those in places without racial change on 
the staffing influence items discussed in the earlier part of the chapter.  We hypothesized that the 
impact of some items might vary with the social context within which the agencies operated.  For 
example, police and citizens might view crime trends with more alarm and be more likely to seek 
additional police in a jurisdiction experiencing racial change. 
gave comparable rankings to most items.  Perhaps the most notable difference between the groups is 
that decisions by elected officials and changes in political leadership had much influence on staffing 
increases in 38.5% of agencies in jurisdictions with racial change and only 21.5% of agencies in 
jurisdictions without racial change.  Interpretation of this finding is ambiguous. While it might 
represent the reactions of elites in a dominant racial group, it might also represent gains in political 
power for less powerful racial groups. That is, a change in the balance of political power in some 
jurisdictions might lead to the election of more politicians from less powerful groups.  These 
politicians might then seek more police protection for disadvantaged communities.  At any rate, this 
tentative finding may suggest a need for more explicit research into the links between racial turnover, 
politics, and police staffing. 
As shown in table 3.7, however, respondents in places with and without significant racial change 
Table 3.7.  The perceived influence of selected factors on increases in police staffing by the occurrence 
of  racial change in the jurisdiction: Large agencies which grew from 1996 to 1999 
Racial change (n=107)  No racial change (n=163) 
Little  Some  Much  Little  Some  Much 
Levels of crime or volume of calls for service  21.7%  44.3%  34.0%  21.4%  40.4%  38.3% 
Dramatic, highly visible crimes or crime sprees  56.5%  35.2%  8.3%  65.3%  23.9%  10.7% 
"  ~ ....  ~ 
Decision by elected officials or changes in political  28.9%  32.6%  38.5%  39.2%  39.4%  21.5% 
leadership 
Demands from business groups, citizen activities, or  43.7%  40.3%  16.1%  39.2%  47.0%  13.9% 
community groups 
Availability of grant money  15.7%  23.5%  60.8%  14.3%  31.6%  54.2% 
Changes in population size in  your jurisdiction  39.6%  31.7%  28.7%  33.5%  30.7%  35.8% 
Changes in tax revenues or fiscal constraints  44.5%  40.4%  15.1%  46.3%  37.8%  15.9% 
._ 
Change in agency's budgeted or authorized force  24.2%  38.6%  37.2%  21.5%  37.8%  40.7% 
Availability of qualified recruits  50.5%  30.3%  19.2%  60.6%  25.6%  13.9% 
Acquisition of new technology  47.8%  33.9%  18.4%  52.9%  33.4%  13.8% 
-  ~  ~ 
Change of police strategy  38.2%  42.8%  19.0%  36.9%  39.9%  23.2% 
Relatively few respondents reported any economic decline in their jurisdictions during the past 
few years.  As shown in table 3.8, small agencies in places with deteriorating economic conditions 
were more likely to decrease in size than were small agencies in other jurisdictions.  Large agencies 
were less likely to increase and more likely to decrease under worsening economic conditions.''  Note, 
moreover, that economic decline appeared to reduce police strength despite increases in crime.  Sixty- 
four percent of all agencies reporting worsening economic conditions also reported increases in crime 
l9 Respondents were asked whether economic conditions in their jurisdiction had improved a lot, improved a 
little, remained the same, worsened a little, or worsened a lot.  The counts of places with economic deterioration 
presented in the text are based on agencies that experienced any worsening of economic conditions.  Very few 
respondents reported conditions that had worsened a lot. 
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economic deterioration. 
Table 3.8.  Change in police force size by  economic change and agency size 
Economy:  Economy : 
Same or better (n=1130) 
Large  Small  Large  Small 
(n=507)  (n=623)  (n=39)  (n=82) 
Increase in  force  53.4%  51.8%  32.7%  49.6% 
No change in force  36.4%  28.2%  38.5%  17.6% 
Worse (n=121) 
....  ....  .........  -  ..  .-  ........  ........  ._  .. 
Decrease in force  10.2%  20.0%  28.8%  32.8% 
The perceptions of police do not support the view that worsening economic conditions lead to 
police growth.  On the contrary, it seems that the fiscal pressures created by economic decline are 
more likely to cause reductions in police (note again that respondents considered government revenue 
and fiscal conditions to be important determinants of changes in agency size).  One implication of this 
finding is that studies using general economic measures like unemployment to test the association 
between economic conflict and police strength should use modeling strategies that can account for the 
possibility that economic deterioration has multiple direct and indirect effects on police strength which 
may operate in opposite directions.  That is, growth in the poor and unemployed may create pressure 
for more police protection, while, simultaneously, declining government revenues decrease the 
availability of resources for policing.  The results also imply that economic measures designed to 
capture inequality, such as surplus value added (e.g., see Nalla et al. 1997), might be better measures 
to use in testing economic conflict theories. 
3.5.2.  Racial Change, Economic Conditions, and Citizen Demand for Police Service 
affect citizens’ demands for police service.  Respondents were asked to judge the influence of several 
factors on demands for police service, including items reflecting racial change and economic 
conditions.  As shown in table 3.9, large agency respondents gave more weight to racial and economic 
factors than did small agencies.  Respondents from both groups of agencies felt that economic 
conditions have substantially greater impacts than racial turnover.  Roughly half of large agencies and 
a third of small agencies indicated that economic conditions influence demands for police service. 
About a quarter of large agencies and ten percent of small agencies reported that raciayethnic turnover 
influences demands for police service.’ 
We also examined police officers’ views on whether racial turnover and economic conditions 
Table 3.9.  Influences on citizens’ demands for police service (in percentages) 
Small agencies (n=497)  Large agencies (n=333) 
Little or  Little or 
none  Some  Much  none  Some  Much 
Levels of serious crime  42.6%  .................  36.8%  20.6%  19.1%  49.0%  . 31.9% 
.  Economic  --  ---  .  conditions  .....  like  .  unemployment  63.3%  .....  28.5%  ......  8.2%  49.5% .  38.8%  ..  11.6% 
~--  . .......  .-  .  ..  .._l-_l___ 
Tension regarding racial / ethnic turnover  91.6%  7.3%  1.2%  72.8%  23.0%  4.2% 
......... Population  .............. growth  .-  .  ... 46.1%  34.9%  .. -.  19.1%  .  27.2%  39.5%  33.3% 
in neighborhoods  ...  ..  . 
....  High  .........................  profile crimes  ................  or rashes  ...  of  crime  58.6%  .............................................  33.7%  7.8%  36.8%  ...........  46.2%  ...  17.1% 
Adoption of  different call response system  82.2%  13.7%  4.1%  74.3%  19.4%  6.3% 
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experiencing racial turnover or economic decline with those of respondents whose jurisdictions were 
not having such changes.  Respondents regarded tensions associated with racial turnover to be minor 
influences on calls for service regardless of whether their jurisdictions were experiencing such 
turnover.*'  In general, respondents regarded economic conditions to be a more important influence on 
demands for police service.  Moreover, respondents judged economic conditions to be more important 
if their own jurisdictions were experiencing economic difficulty.  Approximately 55% of respondents 
in jurisdictions experiencing some level of economic decline felt that economic conditions had some 
or much influence on citizen demand, while 35% of those in other jurisdictions felt that this was true. 
We did not assess the direction of these perceived effects, but it seems most likely that deteriorating 
economic conditions would lead to more crime, disorderly conditions, and, consequently, citizen fear. 
Table 3.10.  Influences on calls for service* 
Racial change (n=249)  No racial change (n=579) 
No  Some  Much  No  Some  Much 
Levels of serious~ciime  36.9%  35.7%  27.4%  43.6%  38.3%  18.1% 
Economic conditions like  53.5%  34.2%  12.4%  66.3%  26.5%  7.2% 
__ 
unemdovment 
Tension regarding racial / ethnic  88.8%  10.6%  .6%  92.5%  5.9%  1.5% 
turnover  .  -. . .  - .  -. 
..................................................................................................................................................................  " 
..... High profile crimes  __  or rashes of  crime  50.9%  43.6%  5.5%  60.4%  31.8%  7.8% 
Population growth  29.8%  42.2%  28.0%  49.2%  33.4%  17.4% 
Adoption of different call response  80.8%  15.6%  3.7%  82.0%  13.7%  4.4% 
system 
Table 3.11.  Influences on calls for service" 
Economic decline (n=81)  No economic decline (n=749) 
No  Some  Much  No  Some  Much 
Levels  ~  of serious crime  41.5%  25.9%  32.6%  41.6%  39.1%  19.3% 
Economic conditions like  45.3%  41.9%  12.8%  65.3%  27.0%  7.6% 
unemployment  .. 
Tension regarding racial / ethnic  81.4%  12.7%  5.9%  92.2%  7.2%  .6% 
turnover 
High  -  profile crimes or rashes of  ~  crime  ~  61.6%  ~  25.0%  13.4%  57.0%  35.6%  7.4% 
Population growth  74.2%  19.4%  6.4%  40.8%  37.5%  2 1.7%  -  .-  .-  .-  .-  .-  .- 
~  ~ 
Adoption of different call response  64.8%  27.9%  7.3%  84.5%  11.9%  3.7% 
system 
A caveat to this finding is the possibility that respondents' answers on this topic were contaminated by views 
20 
considered to be socially desirable. 
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Notwithstanding the caveats offered throughout this chapter, what sorts of generalizations might 
we draw from the preceding results?  For one thing, police perceptions support some of the leading 
theories about the determinants of police staffing:  changes in crime, calls for service, and population 
were leading influences on growing agencies during recent years, while government finances and 
fiscal constraints were among the leading factors cited by shrinking agencies.  The availability of both 
grant money and qualified recruits are additional resource-related factors that, while not often studied 
in the past, have had important influences on staffing changes during the last few years.  The 
importance of grant money to both growing and declining agencies suggests that the federal COPS 
program has perhaps been the single most important factor both facilitating growth and slowing 
reductions in police strength during the latter 199Os, though we should temper this conclusion by 
noting that we did not distinguish between the effects of COPS hiring grants and other federal or state 
hiring grants available during the study period.  Furthermore, it seems that the determinants of police 
staffing examined in this study had similar influences on staffing changes in small and large police 
agencies. 
Some of the determinants of police strength may have differential effects on growth and decline 
in police agencies, a finding that may help to explain some of the conflicting results of prior research 
on this topic.  Most notably, police perceptions suggest that crime fuels growth in staffing but that it 
has little or no influence on reductions in staffing, due perhaps to the mitigating effects of 
organizational inertia and the political difficulties of reducing police forces.  This implies that rising 
crime rates have more impact on police agencies than do declining crime rates.  Consequently, the 
results of any given study of crime and police staffing could be highly contingent on crime trends 
during the study period and assumptions about the functional form of the relationship between the 
variables.  The same may also be true for other variables reflecting demands for police services. 
choice theory.  However, we also examined organizational innovations reflecting the adoption of both 
new policing strategies (e.g., community policing and zero tolerance policing) and new technologies 
and found that they had relatively modest or small effects on police staffing.  Likewise, our 
examination of racial and economic conflict theory explanations was limited.  Although racial change 
did not appear to be linked to recent changes in police staffing, economic conditions seem to affect 
police strength in complex ways. 
service, probably by intensifying criminal and disorderly conditions and citizen fear (a phenomenon 
consistent with both rational public choice and conflict theory predictions).  At the same time, 
however, declining economic conditions and fiscal constraints on government spending appear to be 
linked to reductions in police staffing.  Strong economic conditions, on the other hand, increase the 
resources available for policing but, ironically, may also make it more difficult for police 
organizations to attract and retain good recruits, thereby potentially slowing growth or causing 
reductions in some agencies. 
as may other forces.  Though tentative, perhaps these findings can also help to explain some of the 
mixed results of prior research on the determinants of police strength and stimulate thinking about 
ways to improve studies of this issue. 
This study focused primarily on explanations of police strength consistent with rational public 
Police perceptionssuggest that deteriorating economic conditions increase citizens’ demands for 
Hence, changing economic conditions may have multiple and contrary effects on police strength, 
40  Chapter3 
This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has
not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the
author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of
Justice.CHAPTER 4. 
Hiring, Training, and Retention of 
Police Officers:  A National 
Examination of Patterns and 
Emerging Trends 
Christopher S. Koper and Gretchen E. Moore 
Employing survey data collected from a national sample of police agencies, this chapter provides 
an exploratory examination of a number of issues pertaining to the hiring, training, and retention of 
police officers.  The aim of the chapter is to produce a snapshot of hiring and retention patterns as of 
the year 2000 and to identify contemporary problems and challenges in these areas.  The first part of 
the chapter discusses the length and attrition rates of common steps in the police hiring and training 
process and attempts to identify emerging trends in this area, focusing on recent changes in the length 
of the training process and assessing difficulties which agencies have experienced in filling recent 
vacancies.  The chapter then investigates attrition in police agencies, focusing on the length of service 
of departing officers and the officers’ reasons for leaving their agencies.  An appendix to the chapter 
provides a brief look at the allocation of officers between field and support units and between 
command and line staff. 
baseline data and knowledge that could prove useful to federal policymakers in managing and 
evaluating various aspects of the Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS) program, the federal 
government’s initiative to add 100,000 officers to the nation’s state and local police agencies through 
grants for hiring new officers and other means.  Understanding the typical length of the hiring and 
training process, for example, can help federal authorities in forecasting and monitoring the progress 
of COPS grantees in hiring and deploying COPS-funded officers.  Likewise, understanding typical 
attrition patterns could prove useful in assessing post-grant retention of COPS-funded officers and 
predicting periods when grantees are at greatest risk of cutting positions funded by expired COPS 
grants.  At the same time, however, the information contained in the chapter has much broader 
relevance to police management in general and may prove useful to police administrators in efforts to 
improve forecasting, recruitment, and retention in their organizations. 
survey conducted in the summer of 2000 with a nationally representative sample of 1,270 police 
organizations (see the Methodological Appendix).  We present findings separately for small agencies 
(Le., those serving jurisdictions with fewer than 50,000 residents) and large agencies (i.e., those 
serving jurisdictions with 50,000 or more residents).  Note that this examination of hiring and 
retention patterns is very general and brief due to both the difficulties of investigating these issues in 
depth through a telephone survey and the overall scope of research presented in this volume. 
As stated in the introduction to this volume, the primary purpose of this research was to gather 
The data source for this research is the Police Hiring and Retention (H&R) Survey, a telephone 
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4.1.1.  The Hiring and Training Process 
and testing of applicants (e.g., background checks, oral interviews, written tests, psychological tests, 
and the like”), basidacademy training, and field training2’ Table 4.1 presents the typical length of 
these steps, as reported by the H&R survey respondents.  For officers required to go through all 
training steps, the full length of the screening and training process is approximately 3 1 weeks (7 to 8 
months) in small agencies and approximately 43 weeks (10 to 11 months) in large agencies.23 
The process of hiring and training officers most commonly involves three basic steps:  screening 
Table 4.1.  Average length of  hiring and training steps (in weeks) 
Screening  Academy training  Field training 
Small agencies  6.84  15.17  9.18 
(n=717) 
Large agencies  11.51  17.65  13.37 
(n=553) 
..............................................................................................................................  * ................................................................................................ 
However, developing a more precise model of the hiring and training process requires consideration 
of additional factors. First, agencies do not require all new hires to go through each of the training steps. 
New hires with prior experience as sworn officers, for example, may be exempted from much of the 
training required for new police officers. Second, not all new hires complete their training successfully. 
Therefore, we inquired about agencies’  experiences with hiring new officers during the previous year, 
asking them to report the number of hires and the numbers of those prospective officers who attended 
and successfully completed basidacademy training and field training. 
A total of 999 agencies (479 large and 520 small agencies) reported hiring officers during the prior 
year (about 4.4 officers per agency on average). Figures 4.1 and 4.2  depict the progress of large and 
small agencies in training and deploying these officers. Using large agencies for illustration (see figure 
4.  l),  88%  of the hired officers attended training academies, while the remaining 12% of hires were 
exempt from academy training due to reasons like prior experience or pre-service training. Eighty-one 
out of every eighty-eight (92%)  academy entrants completed academy training successfully.% Hence, 
93%  of hires made it to the field training stage. About 3%  of these officers were hired by agencies that 
did not require field training. Almost 96%  of those who received field training (86 of 90) completed it 
successfully. In sum, 89 of every 100 new hires completed all training successfully. 
”  The 1973 National Advisory Committee on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals recommended that police 
agencies use oral interviews, background checks, physical examinations, and psychological tests (for cognitive 
ability and personality) in selecting officers (Langworthy et al. 1995). 
22 We assume that the reader is familiar with the content of police training and do not discuss this matter in any 
detail. 
23 These findings appear to be broadly consistent with findings from the Bureau of Justice Statistics’ Law 
Enforcement Management and Administrative Statistics (LEMAS) survey, a periodic survey of nationally 
representative samples of local police departments and sheriffs’ agencies.  According to the 1997 LEMAS 
survey of local police departments (Reaves and Goldberg 2000), the average training time for agencies serving 
jurisdictions of 50,000 or more persons ranged from 537 to 878 classroom hours (13-22 weeks) and from 374 to 
501 field hours (9-12.5 weeks).  For agencies serving  jurisdictions with fewer than 50,000 persons, the average 
classroom hours ranged from 321 to 518 (8-13 weeks), and the field training hours ranged from 101 to 401 (2.5 
to 10 weeks). 
We did not inquire as to whether the other academy entrants failed the academy or left voluntarily. 
24 
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agencies were exempt from academy training (see figure 4.2). In small agencies, 92 of every 100 new 
hires completed all training requirements successfully. 
These results imply that for every 100 new positions created in police agencies (say, for example, 
by COPS grants), between 89 and 92 are filled by fully trained officers (i.e., officers who have 
completed both basidacademy and field training) within a year, based on the typical length of hiring 
and training processes and the normal rate of attrition among trainees.25 The rate at which agencies fill 
the remaining positions is likely to depend upon a number of factors such as the pace of agencies’ 
recruitment activities (e.g., periodic or continual), the number and timing of classes at the training 
academies used by the agencies, and the number of officers departing the agencies during the course of 
the year. 
86 Pass 
3 No Field Training  + 
Figure 4.1.  The hiring and training process in large agencies 
89 ‘To  the 
Street” 
(of total hires) 
88 to Academy 
I  92 ‘To the  1 
Figure 4.2.  The hiring and training process in small agencies 
64 to Academy 
100 Hired  59 Pass 
36 Exempt 
/i  4 Fail  I  I 
5 No Field Training  I  Street” 
(of total hires) 
25 This statement assumes that funding is in place for hiring the new officers.  The local budgetary and/or grant 
application procedures involved in acquiring funds for new positions add more time, of course, to the hiring 
process.  We did not feel that it was practical to explore the details of these processes with a telephone survey. 
However, the steps and time involved in acquiring COPS hiring funds have been discussed elsewhere (Roth et al. 
2000b). 
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There have been important changes in police work during recent years that have ramifications for 
police training.  Perhaps the most prominent change has been the growing adoption of community 
policing, a philosophy that shifts more emphasis to various means of proactive crime prevention and 
community partnership building. Community policing means different things in different places, but 
many activities commonly associated with community policing (e.g., structured problem solving) require 
skills falling outside the scope of more traditional police training. Accordingly, many police 
departments are incorporating community policing components into their training regimens.  As of 1999, 
for example, more than half of the nation’s local police departments employing nearly 90% of all officers 
trained at least some of their new recruits in community policing skills (Hickman and Reaves 1999, p. 9). 
One of the primary goals of the COPS program has been to facilitate the spread of community policing, 
and earlier research conducted with a subsample of agencies in the H&R survey suggested that COPS 
grants have sped transitions to community policing among grantees (Roehl et al. 2000). 
In light of these developments, we inquired about changes in the length of police training 
(academyhasic and field) since 1995, the first full year of the COPS program.  Overall, 57% of 
agencies reported an increase in the length of their training process (as shown in table 4.2, this figure 
was virtually the same for small and large agencies).  One-third of agencies reported that the process 
had increased by up to 3 weeks, while a quarter reported that the process had increased by a month or 
more.  Only 3.6% of agencies reported a decrease in the length of training.26 
Agencies that experienced an increase in training time were asked about the sources of this 
change. As shown in table 4.2, changes in the required hours of academy or field training  0 requirements were each cited by roughly 40% to 50% of both large and small agencies.  However, our 
primary focus was on the contribution of community policing to this trend.  Community policing 
training requirements contributed to increases in training time for just under a third of both small and 
large agencies that reported an increase in training time.  Overall, therefore, roughly 18% of all police 
agencies (57% * 31%) have increased their training time since 1995 in order to, at least in part, 
provide training in community p~licing.’~ 
26 Other research has provided conflicting indications on this point.  Langworthy et al. (1995) found increases in 
the length of both academy and field training from 1990 to 1994 among agencies having more than 500 officers. 
LEMAS surveys (see footnote 3) showed no increase from 1993 to 1997 in the average number of required 
training hours for local police departments or Sheriffs’ agencies, but they did show increases in training time 
from 1990 to 1997 for Sheriffs’ agencies (see Goldberg and Reaves 2000; Reaves 1996; Reaves and Goldberg 
2000; Reaves and Smith 1996). Reports from the 1999 LEMAS (Hickman and Reaves 2001; Reaves and 
Hickman 2001) do not address possible changes in training time since 1997, so the difference between the H&R 
and LEMAS results could be due to very recent changes in training requirements. Another possibility is that the 
increases in training time reported by H&R respondents have been slight (the H&R response categories cover 
very broad ranges of time) and were not detected by the earlier LEMAS surveys.  Or, perhaps some agencies 
have increased training time, or even the length of time over which training occurs, without official changes in 
department or state policies regarding training hours (for example, Langworthy et al. [  19951 reported that the 
probationary field training period required by very large police agencies did not increase from 1990 to 1994, but 
the number of days that new recruits were paired with field training officers did increase significantly). 
In verbatim responses collected from a small group of agencies, other causes for training increases included 
the need to cover more topics and skills, such as driving techniques, CPR, radar use, school resource officer 
training, foreign languages, and other issues.  Several agencies reported that a general increase in the complexity 
of police work means that there is more to cover in training.  Other responses included state requirements and/or 
internal department factors like a new chief or administration that chose to increase the training time. 
27 
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Large agencies  Small agencies 
(n=553)  (n=717) 
% Reporting increase in length of training process  58.4%  57.3% 
Causes of increase for those reporting increase: 
New community policing training requirements in the academy  31.0%  31.0% 
An increase in the reauired hours of academv traininn  44.8%  53.3% 
.................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................. 
.................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................. 
An increase in the required hours of field training  43.4%  43.3% 
4.1.3.  Difficulties in Filling Vacancies 
Some accounts suggest that the national pool of qualified police candidates does not meet current 
demand (Law Enforcement News 2000a).  If true, a number of factors may be contributing to this 
phenomenon.  First, the strong economy of recent years may have lured many good officer candidates 
and experienced officers away from law enforcement and into better paying jobs.  Second, some 
departments may be experiencing or facing unusually high levels of attrition as baby boom generation 
officers reach retirement age (e.g., see Law Enforcement News 2000b).  A third factor may be the 
COPS program.  As of mid-1998, COPS grantees had hired approximately 39,000 officers funded 
through COPS grants (Koper and Roth. 2000).  By May of 1999, approximately 61,000 officer 
positions had been funded through COPS.  The creation of so many additional positions may be 
aggravating candidate shortages.  Further, there is the possibility that COPS-funded officers have 
placed additional strain on training academies, creating problems of overcrowding and delayed entry. 
With these possibilities in mind, we asked agencies whether they had experienced difficulties in 
filling recent vacancies.  We administered these questions to all agencies that had hired officers in the 
previous year, as well as those that had unfilled vacancies during the previous year (19% of the 
agencies which had not hired officers in the previous year indicated having had vacancies during that 
time). 
As shown in table 4.3, a lack of qualified applicants was the primary difficulty faced by agencies 
trying to hire officers.  Over half of small agencies and approximately two-thirds of large agencies 
reported that a lack of qualified applicants caused some or much difficulty in finding officers.  Overall, 
a quarter of the agencies reported that this factor caused much difficulty. 
vacancies caused at least some difficulty in filling positions.  Crowding at academies and failures by 
academy entrants caused serious problems for very few agencies, though they caused some difficulty 
for a notable fraction of the agencies. 
Overall, agencies that experienced difficulty in the hiring process reported an average of 1.4 
vacancies left unfilled.  This amounted to roughly one unfilled vacancy for every three officers hired 
(this was true among both small and large agencies). 
In other analyses (not shown), the hiring difficulties reported by COPS agencies and non-COPS 
agencies were comparable; the most notable differences were modest in absolute terms.  For example, 
unanticipated vacancies caused at least some difficulty for 47.6% of COPS grantees and only 37.8% of 
non-COPS agencies.  COPS grantees were somewhat more likely to have experienced much difficulty 
due to lack of qualified applicants than were agencies without COPS grants (27% to 20%).  Delays 
getting recruits into training academies were only a modest problem for both groups, but COPS 
grantees were somewhat more likely to experience some or much difficulty in this regard (16.5% to 
11.5%). 
Over 40% of small agencies and over 50% of large agencies indicated that unanticipated 
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(n=409 small agencies and 538 large agencies)” 
No difficultv  Some difficultv  Much difficultv 
~ 
Small  Large  Small  Large  Small  Large 
Delays  in getting recruits to academy  85.0%  78.0%  12.0%  18.0%  2.5%  3.3% 
Other causes  77.5%  69.23 
Based on agencies that hired officers and/or  had unfilled vacancies. 
4.2.  OFFICER ATTRITION AND TENURE 
Once officers have been hired and trained, how long do they typically serve with their agencies 
and under what circumstances do they leave? To answer these questions, we questioned H&R 
respondents about the number of officers leaving their agencies during the prior year, the 
circumstances of those officers’ departures, and the departing officers’ lengths of service. 
7% (table 4.4). Overall, 70% of agencies reported losing one or more officers during the previous 
On average, large agencies had a turnover rate of 5%,  and small agencies had a turnover rate of 
year.  e 
Table 4.4.  Annual attrition rates 
Average sworn  Officers departing 
force size  during the prior year  Attrition rate 
Large agencies (n=541)  361.41  17.78  5% 
Small agencies (n=730)  23.6  1.70  7% 
....................................  ......................................  .  ..........................  .  .  .. .  .  ... .  .  .  .. .  .  .  .  .  .  .. .  ... .  .  .  .  .  .  .  ... ... .  .  .  .  ... .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  ... .  ... .  ..  .  .  .. .  .. .  ... .  .  .  .  .  .. .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  ..  .  .  . 
4.2.1.  Sources of Officer Attrition 
Sources of officer attrition are presented in table 4.5.28  A minority of officers leaving small 
agencies left due to retirement, medical reasons, or dismissal.  About 20%  of departing officers were 
retirees.  The majority (59%) of departing officers left due to other circumstances which might have 
included transfers to other law enforcement agencies or a move out of the policing profession. 
Small agency respondents estimated that about 45% of their departing officers went on to work 
for other law enforcement agencies.29 While some of the officers leaving to join other law 
28 Respondents were questioned about the number of officers leaving their agencies during the past year and 
asked to provide the number leaving under the circumstances listed in table 4.5.  The figures presented in table 
4.5 are based on 816 of 894 agencies (91%) reporting the loss of one or more officers.  The agencies retained for 
the analysis are those whose respondents provided counts of officers leaving due to retirement, disability, etc. 
which summed accurately to the total number of officers reported to have left the agency during the prior year. 
This estimate and the corresponding  estimate noted below for large agencies are based on 760 respondents 
whose estimates of  departing officers by reason and length of service (see below) both summed accurately to the 
total number of departing officers. Note also that the survey question on subsequent law enforcement service 
29 
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other agencies, it seems likely that most of these officers were among the 59% of officers departing for 
“other,” non-medical and non-disciplinary reasons. This suggests, in turn, that about 35% of all 
departing officers ( 100%-20%-45%) left the policing profession for non-retirement reasons:  about 
21% probably had their careers cut short by disability or dismissal (assuming these officers obtain no 
additional law enforcement work), and the remaining 14% appear to have left the policing profession 
for other reasons. 
In large agencies, some patterns were notably different. About half of the officers departing from 
large agencies were retirees.  Hence, officers working in large departments seem more likely to serve 
full careers in their agencies than do their counterparts in small departments. Dismissals and medical- 
related departures accounted for small to modest percentages of departing officers.  Over a third of 
departing officers left for other reasons. 
Twenty-four percent of officers departing from large agencies were estimated to have gone to 
work for other law enforcement agencies. Assuming that these officers were among the 36% leaving 
for “other” reasons implies that about 27% of all departing officers probably left the policing 
profession for non-retirement reasons (100%-49%-24%). About 14% probably had their careers ended 
by medical or disciplinary reasons, while the remaining 13% appear to have left the policing 
profession of their own volition. 
Table 4.5.  Sources of officer attrition: Percentages of officers 
leaving under selected circumstances* 
Retirement  Disability / medical  Dismissal  Other 
Small agencies (n=424)  20%  6%  15%  59% 
Large agencies (n=392)  49%  5%  9%  36% 
............................................................................................................................  .  ..................................................................................................... 
*  Percentages may not add to 100 due to rounding. 
4.2.2.  Length of  Service of Departing Officers 
had served 15 or more years with their agencies (see table 4.6), numbers virtually identical to the 
estimates of retiring  officer^.^'  In general, we can estimate that these officers had served for 20 or 
more years; the length of service required to receive full retirement benefits averages 20 years for 
small agencies and 23 years for large agencies. At the other extreme, two-thirds of the officers leaving 
small agencies had five or fewer years of service, as did one-third of officers leaving large agencies. 
Officers with intermediate lengths of service (i.e., 6-14 years) were the least prevalent among 
departing officers in both groups of agencies. 
officers who decide to take jobs with other law enforcement agencies and those who choose to leave 
the profession entirely are most likely to do so early in their careers. In small agencies, other factors 
Twenty-one percent of officers leaving small agencies and 46% of those leaving large agencies 
The high representation of short-term officers among departing sworn personnel may suggest that 
inquired about officers leaving to serve with “another law enforcement agency.” It is not clear if or how many 
respondents might have included private security jobs in that estimate. 
The analysis of officer tenure is based on 804 agencies whose respondents provided counts of officers leaving 
after specified periods of service  (i.e., 1 to 5 years, 6 to 14 years, 15 years or more) that summed to the number 
of officers reported to have left the agency during the prior year.  Overall, 894 agencies reported that one or 
more of their officers departed during the prior year. 
30 
Hiring, Training, and Retention of Police Officers:  A National Examination of Patterns and Emerging Trends  47 
This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has
not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the
author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of
Justice.may contribute to higher losses among relatively new officers:  low pay and benefits; officers leaving 
@  for larger and/or more prestigious agencies after gaining a few years of experience; and retirees from 
large agencies working a few post-retirement years in management positions in small agencies.31 
Table 4.6.  Officer tenure: Departing officers by  time served with agency* 
Served  Served  Served 
c=  5 years  6-14 years  >=15  years 
Small Agencies (n=427)  66%  14%  21% 
Large Agencies (n=377)  33%  21%  46% 
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*  Percentages may not add to 100 due to rounding. 
4.3.  DISCUSSION 
This paper has taken a brief look at contemporary patterns in the hiring, training, and retention of 
police officers.  Perhaps the most noteworthy findings concern officer recruitment and retention.  Over 
half of small agencies and two-thirds of large agencies reported that a lack of qualified applicants 
caused them difficulties in filling vacancies during 1999. While we do not have historical data to 
show whether this problem has become worse over time, the findings lend credence to anecdotal 
accounts suggesting that police recruitment is becoming more difficult for agencies around the country 
(e.g., Butterfield 2001; Law Enforcement News 2000a). 
Unanticipated vacancies may be exacerbating this problem; 56% of large agencies and 44% of 
small agencies reported difficulties in maintaining staffing levels due to unanticipated vacancies. 
Further, an estimated two-thirds of officers who left small agencies and a third of those who left large 
agencies in 1999 had served for 5 or fewer years, suggesting that agencies are having difficulties with 
retaining new hires.  As with the recruitment findings, however, welack the historical data to show 
whether this pattern represents a new development (and note that many of these officers are thought to 
be continuing in law enforcement work with other agencies). 
Nevertheless, the findings on officer recruitment and retention could be a warning flag for law 
enforcement.  It is likely that the strong economy of recent years has aggravated recruitment and 
retention problems by luring some potential and new recruits away from law enforcement and into 
better paying jobs in the private sector.  Increasing college requirements for law enforcement officers 
(Reaves and Goldberg 1999, p. v; 2000, p. 5)  and current criticism of police over matters such as racial 
profiling and excessive use of force could be discouraging some from the profession as well.  Further, 
the recent hiring binge in law enforcement, fueled by the COPS program, may have significantly 
drained the pool of potential applicants, thereby increasing competition between agencies for good 
31 Certain aspects of agencies’ retirement plans may also influence the differences in time served between 
officers leaving small and large agencies.  An officer must typically serve for some period of time before 
becoming vested in his or her agency’s retirement plan (when vested, the officer can leave the agency and retain 
his or  her retirement savings). While the average time to vesting does not differ much between large and small 
agencies, there are some differences in the distribution of vesting periods.  The primary difference is that 1  1.4% 
of small agencies have immediate vesting, while only 3.3% of large agencies have immediate vesting.  At the 
opposite end of the spectrum, 6.6% of small agencies require 15 years of service for vesting in contrast to nearly 
13% of large agencies. These differences may be another reason why officers in large departments serve in the 
same agency for longer periods. 
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Justice.officers.  These problems could become worse as larger numbers of baby boom officers enter their 
retirement years.  Hence, strengthening methods for recruiting and retaining qualified officers could be 
emerging as one of the major contemporary challenges facing law enforcement administrators. 
Another implication of the findings is that efforts by OCOPS and other agencies to increase 
police staffing through grants for hiring new officers may be approaching a saturation point, at least 
for the present.  Hence, COPS grants that attempt to put more officers in the field through efficiency 
gains from newly funded civilians and technology, rather than through funding new sworn officers, 
could begin to assume a more prominent role in OCOPS’ funding efforts.  Of course, it remains to be 
seen whether the nation’s changing economic conditions will alter the patterns of hiring and retention 
observed in this study. 
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SOME THOUGHTS ABOUT FUTURE LINES OF INQUIRY 
4.A.1.  Allocation to Field and Support Units 
H&R survey interviewers inquired about the number of officers working in field units, defined as units 
doing patrol, investigations, or other field work, and the number working in non-field support units, 
such as administrative services, technical services, or planning and research.  We used these numbers 
to develop the estimates of field to support officer ratios displayed in table 4.A.  1. The first set of 
estimates is based on all respondents. The estimates reflect the ratio of the mean number of officers 
reported to be in field units to the mean number of officers reported to be in support units.  Because 
some respondents reported numbers of officers in field and support units that were not consistent with 
their agency’s overall sworn force, we calculated separate estimates based on agencies whose 
respondents reported numbers of officers in field and support units that summed to within 5% of their 
agency’s overall sworn force size (“best data” respondents). Using the separate estimates as ranges, 
they imply that 81%  to 85% of sworn officers in small agencies serve in field units, as do 77% to 80% 
of sworn officers in large agencies.32 
Once agencies have hired and trained officers, how do they allocate them across units and ranks? 
Table 4.A.1.  Ratio of sworn officers in field units to sworn officers in support units 
All respondents  Best data respondents 
Small agencies  4.35  5.7 
n=717  n=240  ............. ........ ..............................  ..... ... .... .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  ... .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .. .  .  .  .  .... .  .  .  .  .  .. .  .... .. ..... .  .. .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .. ... .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .. .  .  .. .. .  .... .  .  .  ........ 
Large agencies  4.01  3.48 
4.A.2.  Ratio of Command Staff to Officers 
Interviewers also asked respondents to estimate the ratio of command staff to officers in their 
respective agencies. Because police agencies use a variety of rank structures, we allowed respondents 
to define “command staff’ as it applies for their agency.  In departments with more than a few officers, 
we can expect command staff to comprise officers ranking above the department’s  first supervisory 
rank.  In larger agencies, for example, ranks of lieutenant or above would most likely qualify as 
command staff. 
officer in small agencies (the range is based on separate estimates calculated for all respondents and 
the “best data” respondents used in the previous section). For large agencies, this figure ranges from 
28.26 to 31.54. Focusing on the “best data” estimates, there is thus one command staff officer for 
approximately every 10 officers in small agencies and every 28 officers in large agencies. 
Table 4.A.2. shows that there are an estimated 7.3  1 to 9.63 line officers for every command staff 
Similarly, a Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS) 1996 census of state and local law enforcement agencies 
32 
reported that about 79%  of all state and local law enforcement officers serve in the field, responding to calls for  0 service or conducting investigative duties (Reaves and Goldberg 1998, p. 3).  The H&R survey did not inquire 
about the specific duties of non-field support officers, but the BJS census suggests that about half of these 
officers perform jail or court-related duties while the remainder conduct various administrative, training, 
research, and technical support activities. 
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All respondents  Best data respondents 
Small agencies  7.31  9.63 
Large agencies  31.54  28.26 
n=710)  n=240) 
(n=526)  (n=240) 
.........................................................................  i  .............................................................  i  ...................................... 
Combining these estimates with the estimates of officer allocation between field and support units 
suggests the following. (The following figures are based on the “best data” estimates of officer 
allocation.) For every 100 officers serving in large agencies, roughly 77 officers work in field service 
units, while the remaining officers work in support units.  Based on the estimated ratio of command 
staff to officers, about 3 command staff officers are required to supervise the 77 field officers. 
Therefore, we can estimate that there are 74 officers serving in non-command field assignments for 
every 100 officers serving in large agencies. For small agencies, the comparable figure is about 76 
officers. Note, however, that command staff in smaller agencies probably participate more 
significantly in field activity. 
positions.  Officers in large agencies must serve nearly three and a half years on average before being 
eligible for a supervisory position, while their counterparts in small agencies must serve a little over 
two years on average. For both large and small agencies, the lowest ranking supervisory position is 
typically that of sergeant or corporal (table 4.A.4), though this vanes more widely in smaller agencies. 
Once promoted to the lowest ranking supervisory position, officers must serve 1.2 and 1.7 years 
in small and large agencies, respectively, to be promoted to the next supervisory rank (table 4.A.3). In 
sum, therefore, officers in large agencies must serve over 5 years on average before reaching middle 
management positions, while those in small agencies must serve an average of 3.4  years. 
Table 4.A.3 illustrates the years of service required for officers to move into supervisory 
Table 4.A.3.  Years of service required for supervisory positions 
Lowest ranking  Promotion to 
supervisory position  next rank 
Large agencies  3.41  1.74 
(n=536) 
(n=700) 
........................................................................................................................................................................ 
Small agencies  2.19  1.22 
Table 4.A.4.  Lowest ranking supervisory position 
Small agencies  Large agencies 
(n=700)  <n=536) 
Sergeant  52.8%  76.7%  .................................................................................................................................................................... 
Corporal  17.3%  14.6% 
Patrol Officer  5.2% 
.................................................................................................................................................................... 
...........................................................................................................................................  !:5% ................ 
Chief 
Chief Deputy 
.............................................................................................  ?:?% ........ 
...........................................................................................  ?:?% ........ 
...................  1.8% 
7  RW-  .........  .... ........ .............. ......  Lieutenant  ......................... 
Other 
.I% 
0.0% 
3.7% 
..................................................... 
..................................................... 
......................................................  2.5% 
..................................................... 
Does not apply  ...........................................................................................  ?:?% .....................................  :5%  ................ 
No answer  3.1%  .2% 
Hiring. Training, and Retention  of Police Officers:  A National Examination  of Patterns and Emerging Trends  51 
This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has
not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the
author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of
Justice.We have taken this brief look at officer allocation primarily to stimulate thinking about additional 
organizational issues that could prove relevant to the legacy of COPS.  The impact, if any, of COPS on 
officer allocation between field and support units, for instance, could prove to be a subtle but 
noteworthy topic because of its potential impact on crime control. If COPS grants facilitate the 
deployment of a higher fraction of officers into field units, this might conceivably enhance any crime 
control benefits stemming from COPS (e.g., see Wilson and Boland’s [  19781 discussion of officer 
allocation and crime control). 
allocation may prove to be particularly interesting. MORE grants provide funding for technical 
equipment and civilians that are intended to create time savings which, in turn, enable grantee agencies 
to put more of their officers into the field and/or to keep field officers in the field for greater lengths of 
time.  In other words, MORE grants attempt to increase the number of officers serving in the field 
without increasing the number of officers hired.33 
However, trying to predict how MORE grants might affect officer allocation is an ambiguous 
task.  Grants for civilian hires may often facilitate the redeployment of sworn officers from support 
assignments to fieldwork, thereby increasing the ratio of field to support officers. However, most of 
the productivity gains expected from MORE grants are linked to technology grants; as of mid-1998, 
for instance, about threequarters of the officer equivalents awarded through MORE grants were 
associated with technology grants (Koper and Roth 2000, p. 165). MORE grantees typically use their 
technology awards for things like mobile and desktop computers, computer-aided dispatch systems, 
and booking/arraignment technologies, among other things (Roth et al. 2000~).  While the productivity 
gains from these technologies might sometimes free officers for redeployment from support to field 
tasks, it seems that the major productivity gains permit existing field personnel to spend more time in 
the field and less on administrative  tasks like submitting reports (see Roth et al. 2000~).  That being 
ratio; it is even conceivable that they would have lower ratios because the grants might enable them to 
get the same time in the field from fewer officers or because they would assign more officers to work 
directly with the new technology (for example, assigning sworn officers to new crime analysis tasks 
using new computers). 
MORE grantees.  Small MORE grantees reported field to support officer ratios between 4.76 (all 
respondents) and 4.88 (best data respondents). Large MORE grantees reported ratios between 3.25 
and 3.93.  Comparing these ratios to the allocation ratios shown earlier in table 4.A. 1 suggests that 
MORE grantees do not deploy a higher fraction of their officers into the field than do other agencies 
(the field to support ratios reported by MORE grantees tended to be somewhat lower than those 
reported by the full sample). This would seem to support the notion that MORE grantees are 
achieving their productivity gains primarily by keeping officers in the field for longer periods rather 
than by reallocating officers from support to field positions. We must stress, however, that we lack the 
historical data to show whether MORE grants have altered field and support allocations within the 
MORE agencies.34 
The potential impact of COPS MORE (Making Officer Redeployment Effective) grants on staff 
the case, we would not necessarily expect MORE grantees to have a higher field to support officer 
To take a first exploratory look at this issue, table 4.A.5 displays field to support officer ratios for 
33 Nearly 40,000  of the first 100,OOO  officers awarded through the COPS program were measured in terms of 
@  time savings projected from MORE grants (Koper and Roth 2000). 
For example, it is possible that MORE applicants tend to have a lower fraction of their officers working 
34 
in the field, and that MORE grants have enabled them to raise their field officer allocations. 
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All respondents  Best data respondents 
Small agencies  4.76  4.88 
Large agencies  3.93  3.25 
n=275)  n=102)  ................................................................................  I  ..............................................................  I  ..................................... 
Interviewers also asked respondents if they believed that the share of officers working in non- 
field support units will change in coming years due to factors like civilianization, deployment of new 
technology, privatization, and department reorganization. Although the largest group of respondents 
felt that there would be no change in officer deployment, the remaining respondents were more likely 
to believe that allocation of officers to support services would increase. Results in table 4.A.6 show 
that there were no dramatic differences in the expectations of MORE grantees and other agencies (Le., 
agencies with no COPS grants and agencies with COPS hiring grants only).  Small MORE agencies 
were somewhat less likely to believe that allocation of officers to support units would increase than 
were other small agencies (38% to 46%),  and large MORE grantees (who received MORE-funded 
civilians more often than did small MORE agencies -  see Roth et al. 2000~)  were somewhat more 
likely to believe that such allocation would decrease than were other large agencies (22.8% to 18%). 
Table 4.A.6.  Respondents expectations regarding changes in the 
percentage of  sworn officers working in non-field support services 
COPS MORE grantees  Other agencies 
Small (n=243)  Large (n=328)  Small  (n=367)  Large (n=210) 
Increase a lot  6.7%  5.0%  6.6%  7.4% 
Increase a little  31.3%  29.5%  39.4%  26.1% 
Remain unaffected  56.8%  42.7%  48.7%  48.4% 
....................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 
....................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 
Decrease a little  3.9%  18.9%  4.5%  16.2% 
Decrease a lot  1.2%  3.9%  .8%  1.8% 
....................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 
Although we have focused on officer allocation and COPS MORE grants, there are also 
allocation issues relevant to COPS hiring grants. For example, COPS hiring grants are intended 
specifically to fund officers working in field assignments. Consequently, these grants could be 
increasing both the number and percentage of officers that grantee agencies have working in field 
assignments. If, on the other hand, the ratios of field to support and line to command officers 
presented above reflect organizational necessities (such as optimal supervisory levels for controlling 
corruption), then hiring grantees may tend to adjust to COPS-funded staffing increases by moving 
some non-COPS field officers into supervisory and support roles. 
policing agencies. It would seem that many of the officers placed into community policing 
assignments created with COPS funds, including both experienced officers and new COPS hires,” are 
now eligible for supervisory roles, based on the preceding figures on the time to eligibility for 
supervisory and command staff positions. The success of community policing officers in ascending to 
supervisory roles may prove to be an important organizational factor that affects the speed and 
resilience of an agency’s transition to community policing. 
Another potential question is how COPS might be changing the philosophy of command staff in 
~~~  ~ 
Many COPS hiring grantees place their newly hired COPS officers into regular patrol work and move more 
experienced officers into community policing assignments, a strategy referred to as “backfilling” (see Roth et al. 
35 
2000c). 
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Retention of Staff Positions Funded 
Through the Federal COPS 
Program:  Comparing Retention 
Rates Among COPS Agencies to 
Historical Patterns of Staff 
Retention in Police Agencies 
Christopher S. Koper and Gretchen E.  Moore, With David E.  Huffer 
One of the most ambitious crime policy initiatives of recent years has been the federal 
government’s Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS) program. Passed as part of the Violent 
Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, a primary objective of the COPS program is to add 
100,000  additional police to the nation’s communities. One mechanism for achieving this is hiring 
grants that generally fund up to 75% of the salary and fringe benefits of new officers for three years. 
When the federal government reached the milestone of funding 100,000 officers in May 1999 
(additional officers have been awarded since that time), approximately 61,000 of these officers had 
been funded through hiring grants (the remainder had been funded through grants to improve officer 
productivity by means of new technology and civilian positions). 
The long-term impact of COPS on sworn force levels in the United States will be heavily 
influenced by the extent to which grantees retain COPS-funded positions after the grants expire.  In 
other words, how much of the staffing increase funded by COPS will prove to be temporary and how 
much will last permanently, or at least indefinitely? The first part of this chapter assesses retention of 
COPS-funded positions using survey data gathered from a random sample of over 600 COPS grantee 
agencies (of all sizes and types) that were awarded COPS hiring grants in  1995 or earlier and that were 
interviewed by telephone for the Police Hiring and Retention (H&R) Survey in the summer of 2000 
(see the Methodological Appendix).  The updated survey data permit an assessment of both actual 
retention patterns for positions funded by expired COPS grants and expected retention patterns for 
positions that are still covered by COPS funding requirements. 
As will be shown below, most COPS grantees have retained or expect to retain their COPS- 
funded positions, but a notable minority will not maintain their COPS-funded staffing increases.  This 
may not prevent COPS from adding 100,000 more officers to the nation’s police forces on a temporary 
or permanent basis, but it does imply that COPS will need to fund more than 100,OOO officers to 
achieve a lasting increase of 100,000 officers. Should we view this as a failure of the COPS program? 
Judging the success or failure of COPS in creating stable increases in police staffing can arguably 
be facilitated by reference to historical patterns of staff retention following periods of police growth. 
If, for example, an agency increases its sworn force from 100 to 110 officers, how long should we 
expect the agency to maintain a force of  110 or more officers based on historical norms?  How long 
should we expect the agency to maintain a force greater than its baseline level of  100 officers? The 
second section of this chapter investigates these questions using national data on police employment 
from 1975 through 1994, a period prior to the start of COPS.  We then conclude by contrasting 
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data available at this time, it appears that, overall, observed and expected retention rates among COPS 
grantees are consistent with what we would expect based on historical patterns. 
5.1.  RETENTION OF STAFFING INCREASES FUNDED BY COPS HIRING GRANTS 
As noted above, COPS hiring grants are three-year awards.  After a grant expires, COPS award 
regulations stipulate that the grantee must keep the COPS-funded position(s) for one full budget cycle 
(generally, one year) following the budget cycle in which the grant expires.  Using data gathered 
during the H&R survey, we examine both current retention of positions funded with expired COPS 
grants and expected retention of positions still covered by either COPS funding or COPS retention 
requirements.  H&R survey interviewers administered the COPS retention questions to 638 police 
agencies that were sampled from among year 1995 COPS hiring grantees (see the Methodological 
Appendix).36 These agencies were chosen because they were among the earliest COPS grantees and, 
consequently, were more likely to have expired grants than were later cohorts of hiring grantees. 
Note that in all analyses for this chapter, our focus is upon the retention of positions, irrespective 
of the particular officers filling those positions.  For the COPS retention analyses, we counted 
positions as retained (or likely to be retained) only if they had not been cut (or were not expected to be 
cut) and had not been retained by cutting or using vacancies in non-COPS positions (or were not 
expected to be retained through such means).  By these criteria, an agency with five expired COPS 
positions that reported keeping all five positions through cuts in other positions would not qualify as a 
true retaining agency.  Hence, our focus is on the full or partial retention of staffing increases that were 
achieved with COPS funds.  In other words, does it appear that an agency that had n officers and 
received a grant for k  COPS officers will retain n+k officers or retain at least more than n officers after  0 the expiration of its COPS grant? 
5.1.1. Short-Term Retention of Positions Funded by Expired Grants 
Among the 638 agencies that were questioned about COPS hiring grants during the H&R survey, 
374 (63% weighted) had one or more expired COPS grants. For 185 of these agencies, all COPS 
grants were expired.  As noted earlier, however, COPS grantees are required to keep positions for one 
full budget cycle following the budget cycle in which the positions expire. Hereafter, we use the term 
“programmatically expired positions” to refer to expired COPS positions that have been expired for 
longer than a full budget cycle and are thus eligible for cutting.  Only 277 of the surveyed agencies 
(49% weighted) had programmatically expired COPS positions.  Of this group, 2 13 agencies were no 
longer required to keep any of their COPS-funded positions. 
To determine whether the staffing increases produced by COPS grants had been maintained, 
interviewers inquired as to whether programmatically expired COPS positions had been cut.  If the 
positions had not been cut, interviewers asked whether the agency had kept any of the COPS positions 
by cutting non-COPS positions or by using vacancies that opened up through the departure of officers 
in non-COPS positions. 
programmatically expired COPS positions had cut some or all of these positions (as in the other 
chapters in this volume, we classify large agencies as those serving jurisdictions with 50,000 or more 
persons and classify small agencies as those serving jurisdictions with fewer than 50,000 persons).  In 
addition, nearly 13% of large agencies and nearly 9% of small agencies indicated keeping COPS 
positions through cuts or attrition involving non-COPS positions. 
As shown in table 5.1, about 12% of large agencies and 20% of small agencies with 
These agencies were in the COPS FAST/AHEAD and COPS UHP  strata of  the H&R survey (see the 
36 
Methodological Appendix). 
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14% of the agencies with programmatically expired COPS positions had cut some or all of those 
positions.  Interviewers questioned respondents for these agencies about possible reasons for the cuts. 
Echoing findings discussed elsewhere in this volume, nearly half of the agencies cutting positions 
cited economdfinancial reasons for the cuts, but none of the agencies cited crime reduction as a factor 
(see table 5.2).37 
The key numbers reflecting retention of COPS-funded staffing increases are shown in the fourth 
and fifth rows of table 5.  I. Note that based on the timing of the H&R survey, we can expect that the 
programmatically expired positions had been so since only 1999 or early 2000 (in some cases, perhaps 
as early as 1998).38  Consequently, the retention figures represent short-term retention rates.  Three- 
quarters of large agencies and just over 72% of small agencies with programmatically expired COPS 
positions indicated that they had kept all of their COPS positions without making cuts or using 
attrition of non-COPS positions.  In other words, about three-quarters of large and small agencies had 
fully retained the staffing increases funded by COPS.  The figures change very little when considering 
partial retention of COPS-funded staffing increases; that is, virtually all COPS grantees retaining 
COPS positions without cuts or attrition reported keeping all COPS positions.39 
Table 5.1.  COPS grantees' experiences with retention of programmatically expired cops positions* 
Large agencies  Small agencies 
(n=116)  (n=152)** 
Cut some or all COPS positions  11.2%  20.2% 
.................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 
Keeping some or all COPS positions through cuts or attrition 
Keeping some or all COPS positions using other grants- 
12.6%  8.6% 
1.2%  0.2% 
.................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 
.................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 
Keeping all COPS positions without cuts or attrition (full 
retention of staffing increases) 
75.0%  72.2% 
Keeping some or all COPS positions without cuts or attrition  75.5% 
(full or partial retention of staffing increases) 
73.4% 
* Categories are not mutually exclusive.  Retention status was unclear for 40/, of large agencies and 6% of  small agencies. 
*  Excludes nine agencies that had received supplemental COPS grants (under the Small Communities Grant Program) to assist 
small agencies with retention.  -  Agencies with all programmatically expired positions on other grants were not counted as retaining agencies because the 
positions were not yet on the agencies' base budgets. 
We did not run these analyses separately for large and small agencies due to the small sample size.  Twenty- 
37 
five of the thirty-three agencies were small agencies. 
38 A few thousand of the earliest COPS hiring grants were awarded in late 1993 and 1994 under the Police 
Hiring Supplement (PHS) and COPS Phase I grant programs (Gaffigan et al. 2000). If the sampled agencies had 
such grants, they may have expired programmatically prior to 1999. 
For these analyses, we treat all COPS awards granted to an agency as one staffing increase.  Our data do not 
permit the calculation of retention rates for each individual COPS grant awarded to an agency with multiple 
grants. Likewise, these figures do not refer to the percentage of individual COPS positions that have been 
retained.  An assessment of the number of COPS positions that have been retained (and the number that are 
likely to be retained in the future) will be presented as part of a separate, forthcoming report which will update 
earlier estimates of the COPS program's impact on sworn force levels throughout the nation (Koper and Roth 
2000). 
39 
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Reason 
New political administration with new priorities came into office 
% Saying reason was applicable 
10.5%  ..................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 
Jurisdiction experienced decrease in crime and needed fewer officers  0%  ..................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 
Fiscal constraints  48.6% 
Other reasons  40.8% 
..................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 
5.1.2.  Retention Projections for COPS Positions Not Programmatically Expired 
keep COPS positions that had not programmatically expired @e., positions that had not expired 
financially andor were still covered by the federal one budget cycle retention requirement).  Overall, 
12% to 13% of COPS grantees expect to cut some or all of their COPS positions when the grants 
expire (table 5.3). About 21% of agencies expect to cut non-COPS positions or use attrition to retain 
some or all of their COPS positions. 
The key short-term retention figures are presented in the third and fourth rows of table 5.3.  Just 
over two-thirds of both small and large COPS grantees expect to maintain COPS-funded staffing 
increases in full without cutting other positions or using attrition.  Seventy-four percent of small COPS 
agencies and eighty percent of large COPS agencies expect to retain at least some COPS positions 
without cuts or attrition. 
Respondents were also questioned about the length of time that their agencies expect to keep 
these positions (see bottom two rows of table 5.3). Virtually all of the large agencies expecting to 
maintain COPS positions expect to maintain these positions for five or more years, regardless of 
whether they expect to retain all or just some of the positions.  Small agencies expect some drop in 
their long-term retention rates.  For example, 73.9% of small agencies expect to keep at least some of 
their positions for the short-term, but a little less than 68% expect to keep at least some of their 
positions for as long as 5 years.  Nonetheless, by either definition of retention (full or partial), over 
90% of small retaining agencies expect to retain their positions for the long term.40 
The preceding analyses demonstrate that observed and expected retention rates among COPS 
grantees are high but certainly not perfect.  How might we judge these retention rates?  Should we 
view them as evidence of success or failure? One way that we might begin to answer these questions 
is to put COPS retention rates into an appropriate context.  More specifically, we right ask whether 
retention rates among COPS agencies are consistent with normal practice.  Accordingly, the next 
section examines typical retention patterns in police agencies over the course of 20 years. 
When applicable, respondents were also questioned about whether they expected their agencies to 
The observed and expected retention rates reported here are better than those reported in an earlier evaluation 
of the COPS program.  Preliminary projections based on survey data gathered in the summer of 1998 suggested 
that more than half of grantees might fail to retain at least some of their COPS-funded staffing increases (Roth et 
al. 2000c, pp. 112-1  13). Methodological  differences between this and the earlier study (e.g., differences in the 
groups of agencies surveyed) and differences in the respondents’ levels of experience with expired or nearly 
expired COPS grants at the time of the two surveys probably account for some of  the differing results.  It also 
seems likely that grantees are currently more informed about COPS retention requirements.  At the time of the 
earlier survey, the one budget cycle retention requirement had not been clearly established. Further, the federal 
COPS Office (the agency that administers COPS grants) has recently undertaken efforts to improve grantees’ 
understanding  of programmatic retention requirements, including the stipulation that grantees should use COPS 
funds to supplement, and not supplant, local funds (i.e., grantees should not retain COPS positions by cutting or 
failing to fill other positions). 
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of cops positions not yet programmatically expired 
Large agencies  Small agencies 
(n=238)  (n=286) 
Cutting some or all COPS positions.  13.4%  12.2% 
................................................................................................................................................................................................................................. 
Keeping some or all COPS positions through cuts or attrition. 
Keeping all COPS positions without cuts or attrition (full 
retention of staffing increases). 
20.8%  21.4% 
67.3%  68.0% 
................................................................................................................................................................................................................................. 
Keeping some or all COPS positions without cuts or attrition 
(full or partial retention of staffing increases). 
Keeping all COPS positions without cuts or attrition (full 
retention of staffing increases) for 5 or more  years. 
Keeping some or all COPS positions without cuts or attrition 
(full or partial retention of staffing increases) for 5 or more 
years. 
79.7%  73.9% 
66.7%  62.6% 
................................................................................................................................................................................................................................. 
................................................................................................................................................................................................................................. 
77.9%  67.5% 
5.2.  HtSTORICAL PATTERNS OF STAFF RETENTION 
FOLLOWING PERIODS OF AGENCY GROWTH 
In this section, we investigate historical patterns of staff retention in police agencies using 20 
years of police employment data reported by state and local law enforcement agencies to the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation's Uniform Crime Reports (UCR).41 Our objective is to determine how long 
agencies typically retain new positions following periods of growth.  The analysis is based on 8,365 
agencies that reported employment data with sworn officer counts to the UCR for each year from 1975 
to 1994 and that experienced one or more moderate to large staffing increases from 1976 to 1993. We 
identified such staffing increases by examining the agencies' annual changes in sworn force.  For each 
occasion when an agency experienced a substantial staffing increase, we tracked the agency's 
subsequent annual sworn force levels through 1994 to determine how long the agency maintained 
some or all of that staffing increase. We selected 1994 as the last tracking year because the COPS 
program began that year.  We conducted survival analyses (Allison 1995) with these data to gauge 
typical retention patterns. 
As for most analyses presented in this report, we classified agencies as small or large based on the 
population of each agency's jurisdiction.  In order to focus on changes in agency size that seemed more 
likely to represent meaningful, planned changes (rather than fluctuations due to annual turnover), we 
selected staffing increases of 20% or more for small agencies and 5% or more for large agencies4* 
We also chose these levels because COPS hiring awards through year 2000 have averaged, in sum, 5% 
of the sworn force size of large grantees and 24% of the sworn force size of small grantees; 43 hence, 
the historical analysis is based on staffing increases approximately as large or larger than those 
typically funded by COPS. 
We obtained the data from the UCR's annual Law Enforcement Officers Killed and Assaulted files, which are 
publicly archived by the Inter Consortium for Political and Social Science Research.  The analyses are based on 
actual sworn force levels as opposed to authorized or budgeted sworn force levels, which are not readily 
available. 
volatile in agencies with small numbers of officers. 
Policing Services (the agency which administers COPS grants). 
41 
We selected larger percentage increases for small agencies because percentage changes tend to be more 
These figures are based on an analysis of grant records from the federal Office of Community Oriented 
42 
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increases in large agenciesu  The staffing increases averaged 54% for small agencies and 20% for large 
agencies. The survival time for each staffing increase corresponds to the number of years that the 
agency maintained the new staffing level (or retained at least some portion of the staffing increase).  If 
the agency retained the new staffing level through 1994, then the case was censored at 1994. For 
censored cases, we know only that the higher staffing level was maintained through at least 1994.45 
with n officers grows to n+k officers, how long does the agency maintain a force of at least n+k 
officers?  Table 5.4 presents the probabilities that staffing increases are maintained for selected lengths 
of time based on the estimation of survival functions (see Allison 1995, pp. 9-60).  To illustrate, the 
chance that a staffing increase is maintained in full for at least a year after its occurrence is 63% for 
small agencies and 66% for large agencies.  By the fifth year following a staffing increase, these 
figures decline to 37% and 47% for small and large agencies, respectively.  Therefore, less than half of 
staffing increases in police agencies are maintained fully for at least five years, based on the staffing 
increase criteria used in these analyses.  The full survivor functions for small and large agencies are 
illustrated graphically in figures 5.1 and 5.2. 
Agencies are most likely to fail at maintaining full staffing increases during the first few years 
after the staffing increase occurs. The longer the agency maintains the higher staffing level, the more 
likely it is that the new staffing level will be maintained indefinitely (hence, the survival curves in 
figures 5.1 and 5.2 become flatter over time).  This might suggest that agencies tend to raise staffing 
levels in advance of expected attrition so that the target staffing level is equal to the increase of k 
officers minus some number of officers that are expected to depart. 
increases than are small agencies, but such inferences may be contingent on the magnitudes of the 
staffing increases chosen for analysis.  A 5% staffing increase in a large agency may not affect the 
agency in the same way that a 20% staffing increase affects a small agency. Moreover, large and 
small agency comparisons are not central to the research question under study. 
The first set of analyses examines full retention of staffing increases.  If, for example, an agency 
The data provide some indications that large agencies are more likely to fully maintain staffing 
Table 5.4.  Probabilities that staffing increases will be retained 
in full for selected lengths of time by agency size 
Time  Small agencies  Large agencies 
in years  (n=19,364 staffing increases)  (n=4,565 staffing increases) 
1 Year  .63  .66 
2 years  50  .56 
3 vears  .44  .52 
.......................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 
4 years  .40  .49 
5 vears  .37  .47 
.......................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 
.......................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 
10 years  .30  .44  .......................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 
15 vears  .28  .42 
Note that any given agency may have had multiple staffing increases incorporated into the analysis. 
increase occurring from 1975 to 1976 had 18 years of potential follow-up before censoring.  In contrast, a 
staffing change occurring from 1992 to 1993 had one potential year of follow-up. 
44  *  45 Of course, the potential follow-up time varied according to when the staffing increase occurred.  A staffing 
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Figure 5.2.  Probability that large agencies retain staffing increases 
in full, by years of follow-up 
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Further analyses revealed that full retention varies by the size of the staffing increase.  As shown 
in tables 5.5 and 5.6, staffing increases are more likely to be maintained in full in both small and large 
agencies when they are more modest in size. 
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Time in Years  Increases Below Median:  Increases Above Median: >33% 
20% to 33% 
(n=8,263  staffing increases) 
(n=11,101 staffing increases) 
1  year  .66  .61 
2 years  .54  .48 
4 years  .44  .36 
.35  .27 
15 years  .33  .25 
......................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 
.......................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 
.......................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 
.......................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 
......................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 
3 years  .48  .4 1 
5 years  .4  1  .34 
...  J0.E.?!?.  ...................................................................................................................................................................................................... 
Table 5.6.  Probabilities that staffing increases will be retained 
in full for selected lengths of time by size of staffing increase (large agencies) 
Time  5% to 9.8%  >9.8% 
in years  (n=2,290 staffing increases)  (n=2,275  staffing increases) 
Increases below median:  Increases above median: 
.68  .63  ... !.lea.! ........................................................................................................................................................................................................... 
2 years  .59  .54 
3 years  .55  .49 
5 years  .50  .44 
........................................................................................................................................................................................................................ 
......................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 
4 years  .52  .46 
10 years  .47  .41 
15 years  .45  .40 
......................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 
......................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 
......................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 
In a second set of analyses, we estimated the probability that an agency maintains at least some of 
a staffing increase for selected periods of time.  If, in other words, an agency increases its force from n 
officers to n+k officers, how long does the agency maintain any staffing level higher than its baseline 
level of n?  Using this criterion, agencies are much more successful at retaining staffing growth (see 
table 5.7).  The chance that an agency will retain some of its growth for at least a year is 92% for large 
agencies and 81% for small agencies.  The five-year maintenance rate is 79% for large agencies and 
59% for small agencies.  As in the previous analyses, the likelihood that an agency fails to maintain a 
staffing increase is greatest during the period immediately following the increase.  Also, there are 
again tentative indications that large agencies are more successful at retaining new positions, subject to 
the caveats noted above.  Indeed, 72% of staffing increases in large agencies last in at least some 
residual form for 15 years.  Figures 5.3 and 5.4 illustrate the survivor functions. 
Table 5.7.  Probabilities that staffing increases will be retained 
partially for selected lengths of time by agency size 
Time  Small agencies  Large agencies 
in years  (n=19,364  staffing increases)  (n=4,565  staffing increases) 
1  year  .8 1  .92 
2 years  .72  .87 
3 years  .66  .83 
4years  .62  .80 
........................................................................................................................................................................................................................ 
........................................................................................................................................................................................................................ 
........................................................................................................................................................................................................................ 
........................................................................................................................................................................................................................ 
5 years  .59  .79 
10 years  .51  .74 
......................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 
......................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 
15 years  .48  .72 
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Figure 5.4.  Probability that large agencies retain staffing increases 
partially or fully, by years of  follow-up 
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The size of the staffing increase is not strongly related to this weaker form of retention. Among 
small agencies, the survivor functions for staffing increases above and below the median do not differ 
significantly. For large agencies, the differences are statistically significant but modest. The 
differences are most notable at longer follow-up times. For example, staffing increases above the 
median have a .81 probability of retention to 5 years, while those below the median have a probability 
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To conclude, this investigation has revealed some basic patterns of staff retention in police 
agencies following periods of agency growth.  One conclusion is that it is not uncommon for agencies 
to fail to retain staffing increases for more than a few years.  This is particularly true for full retention 
of staffing increases. In general, agencies are less likely than not to retain full staffing increases for 
more than just a few years following implementation.  In most instances, however, they retain some 
residual of those increases for five or more years.  A second general point is that agencies are at 
greatest risk of retention failure in the first few years after a staffing increase. If an agency manages to 
retain new positions for at least a few years following the staffing increase, it becomes much more 
likely that the agency will retain the new positions for the long term. 
A number of caveats should be noted.  As discussed above, this inquiry is based on a group of 
between 8,000 and 9,000 agencies that experienced staffing increases and reported employment data 
annually to the UCR from the mid-1970s to the mid-1990s.  We cannot say if or how retention 
patterns differ for this subset of agencies and the full universe of police agencies.46 
economic conditions, crime trends, and the availability of grant money, affect retention patterns. 
Testing such hypotheses is beyond the scope of this exploratory in~estigation.~~  Nonetheless, these 
analyses reveal typical retention patterns net of various influences over parts or all of three different 
decades, and they provide a basis for initial comparisons to the COPS retention rates described earlier, 
which were also presented net of other social influences. 
In addition, it is likely that various agency characteristics and external social factors, such as 
46 For some agencies and years, staffing levels listed in the UCR are those reported by agencies in the prior year. 
If such records do not reflect staffing levels accurately, they could potentially bias the types of analyses 
presented here by introducing error into both the identification of staffing increases (in terms of timing and 
magnitude) and the measurement of survival periods.  The analyses presented in the text are based on whatever 
staffing levels were reported in the UCR and assume that those levels are accurate (Le., if the data for agency x, 
year t indicated that agency x's sworn force count was from the prior year, we assumed that agency x did not 
change in size from year t-1 to year t). 
To test the sensitivity of the analyses to this assumption, we identified staffing increases and follow-up 
periods that were potentially contaminated by this possible source of measurement error. (For each agency, we 
identified the last year up through 1994 in which the UCR listed data from a prior year.  For an agency whose 
most recent questionable data year was year t, we flagged all staffing increases and follow-up periods occurring 
up through year t+l as potentially contaminated observations.) This resulted in the loss of 24%  of the 
observations used in the main analyses.  We re-estimated the basic survival functions presented in figures 5.1 
through 5.4 without these potentially contaminated cases. The alternative estimates differed little from those 
presented in the text.  To illustrate, the survival probabilities for partial maintenance of staffing increases in large 
agencies were .93 at year  1, .80 at year 5, and .76 at year 10. For small agencies, the comparable values were 
31,  .60, and .52.  All of these values are nearly identical to those presented in table 5.7. 
However, we conducted tentative analyses on two additional factors: agency type and decade when the 
staffing increase occurred.  A number of basic univariate tests indicated that staffing increases are more likely to 
be maintained in county and municipal agencies and less likely to be maintained in sheriffs'  agencies.  We also 
found some indications that staffing retention has improved over time.  In general, retention was somewhat 
higher in the 1980s and early 1990s than in the 1970s. 
For the latter analyses, we compared survival functions for staffing increases occurring during the 
1970s and 1980s (we excluded the 1990s due to the short follow-up periods available for observations from that 
decade).  In addition, we contrasted 2-year survival rates for staffing increases occurring during 1970s, 1980s, 
and early 1990s (1990-1992). For example, the probabilities that staffing increases would be maintained in part 
for two years in small agencies were 69%,  72%,  and 75%  for, respectively, those occurring during the 1970s, 
1980s, and early 1990s. The comparable figures for large agencies were 82%, 88%, and 89%. 
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RETENTION PATTERNS 
For comparative purposes, the observed retention rates for COPS agencies with programmatically 
expired COPS positions and the initial, post-expiration (Le., short-term) retention rates expected for 
agencies with non-expired COPS positions should be most comparable to the 1-2 year retention rates 
in the historical analysis. For long-term assessments, we can compare the expected 5-year retention 
rates for COPS agencies to the historical 5-year patterns. 
Relative to historical patterns, full retention of staffing increases appears to be greater among 
COPS grantees. For example, 72% of small agencies with programmatically expired COPS positions 
and 75% of corresponding large agencies have retained all of their expired COPS positions.  Based on 
historical patterns, in contrast, we would expect only 50% to 63% of small agencies and 56% to 66% 
of large agencies to retain all new positions. 
However, these comparisons are likely to be misleading. As shown in the historical analysis, full 
retention of a staffing increase is sensitive to the size of the staffing increase -  the larger the increase, 
the less likely it is that the agency will maintain the new staffing level in full for any given length of 
time.  Because the staffing changes analyzed in the historical study tended to be substantially larger 
than COPS-funded staffing increases,  the preceding comparisons have a bias in favor of COPS. 
Partial retention of staffing increases, on the other hand, tends to be less sensitive to the magnitude 
of the staffing change (see previous section) and may therefore provide a more reliable means of 
comparing COPS and historical retention patterns. Table 5.8 presents a series of comparisons using this 
less restrictive retention criterion. The range of short-term (i.e., 1-2 year) estimates for COPS grantees in 
table 5.8 is based on both observed retention rates for expired COPS positions and expected short-term 
retention rates for non-expired COPS positions. The long-term (i.e., five-year) projections for COPS 
grantees are based on expectations  about the retention of non-expired positions. 
Table 5.8.  Retention of  cops-funded positions (actual  and expected) compared to historical norms: 
Probabilities that at least some new positions are retained for selected follow-up periods 
Small agencies  large agencies 
~ 
COPS  Historical  COPS  H  istor  ica I 
1.2 years  ~  73%.74%*  __  ~  72%-81%  7  5%,-80%*  87%,-92% 
5 years  68%"  59%  78%**  79% 
* Ranges based on short.term  retention experience with expired grants and short-term retention projections for 
nomexpired grants (see tables 5.1 and 5.3). 
** Based on long.term retention projections for non-expired grants (see table 5.3). 
Overall, the estimates in table 5.8  suggest that retention rates among COPS grantees will be 
comparable to historical patterns. Retention rates among small COPS agencies will be consistent with 
historical patterns in the short-term and better than historical patterns in the long-term. Retention rates 
for large COPS agencies will be somewhat lower than historical projections in the short-term but are 
expected to be virtually identical to historical patterns in the long-term. 
These comparisons should be treated cautiously because they are based largely on the future 
expectations of COPS grantees; only a relatively small fraction of COPS agencies had actual 
experience with retention of programmatically expired COPS grants by the time of the H&R survey. 
Further, the historical investigation was of necessity a somewhat crude method of identifying and 
analyzing staffing changes in police agencies.  But based on the limited data available at this time, we 
can say cautiously that retention rates among COPS grantees, while not perfect, will be comparable to 
historical norms of staff retention in police agencies. If  COPS grantees' projections prove accurate, 
then it seems that money invested in raising police staffing levels through COPS grants will produce a 
return on investment comparable to the usual return on investments to raise police staffing levels. 
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0 The Police Hiring and Retention 
(H&R) Survey 
A.l.  OVERVIEW OF THE COPS-POLICE HIRING AND RETENTION SURVEY SAMPLE 
From June through August of 2000, interviewers from the National Opinion Research Center 
(NORC) conducted telephone interviews with a nationally representative sample of  1,270 police 
agencies. Each interview was conducted with the chief of police or a representative designated by the 
chief of police. Project staff selected and interviewed these agencies initially in 1996 as part of the 
Urban Institute's (UI) national evaluation of the COPS program (Roth et al. 2000a). Project staff re- 
interviewed these agencies during the summer of 2000 for an updated study of the COPS program. 
The follow-up interviews also included a series of questions pertaining to general hiring and retention 
practices (referred to throughout this volume as the H&R survey). 
stratified by jurisdiction size and COPS funding status and program type as of  1996 (the development 
of the survey design is discussed below).  Large agencies are categorized as those serving jurisdictions 
of 50,000 or more persons (see table A. 1). The remaining agencies constitute  the small agency group. 
COPS grantees and large agencies were sampled disproportionately due to, respectively, the survey's 
role in the ongoing UI evaluation of the COPS program and the disproportionate concentration of the 
nation's police officers in large jurisdictions. The data were weighted to provide national estimates. 
The breakdown of COPS grantee status shown in table A.2 represents the agencies' grant status as of 
year 2000.  By that time, 86% of the agencies were COPS grantees; 59% of the agencies had been 
funded with COPS hiring grants.48 
Sheriffs' agencies are the next most common agency type.  State police and other miscellaneous 
agencies account for less than 10 percent of the sample. 
Key characteristics  of the sample are presented in tables A.l through A.3.  The sample is 
As shown in table A.3, the majority of the agencies are municipal or county police agencies. 
Table A.l.  Jurisdiction size of sample agencies (n=1,270) 
Average  % of  % of 
Size  number of officers  sample  weighted sample 
Large: population of 50,000 or more  361.4  43.5  5.0 
Small: population less than 50,000  23.6  56.5  95.0 
48 Some agencies changed COPS funding status from 1996 through 2000.  In 1996,293 of the agencies in the 
sample (23%) were not funded through the COPS program.  By 2000, 175 of these agencies (14%  of the sample) 
still did not have COPS funding.  Only 2.8% of the agencies changed from being grantees in 1996 to non- 
grantees by 2000. 
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% of sample  % of weighted sample 
COPS Grantee  86.2  62.5 
Hiring Grantee  59.2  54.0 
No COPS Grants  13.8  37.5 
........................................................................................................................................................................................... 
Table A.3.  Agency types of  sample agencies (n=1,270)* 
yo of sample  % of weighted sample 
Municipal / County  80.1  78.3 
Sheriff  13.1  13.1 
........................................................................................................................................................................................... 
University or School Police  2.8  4.6 
State Police  1.4  1  .o 
Other""  2.5  2.7 
........................................................................................................................................................................................... 
........................................................................................................................................................................................... 
* Percentages may not add to 100 due to rounding. 
xx  "Other" agencies include transit police, public housing police, park police, tribal police, and other 
miscellaneous agency types. 
A.2.  DEVELOPMENT OF THE SAMPLE DESIGN 
The sample design is based on that developed in  1996 for the UI evaluation of the federal COPS 
program (Roth et al. 2000a). To create the 1996 sample, UI staff utilized records from the federal 
Office of Community Oriented Policing Services (the COPS Office), the Uniform Crime Reports, and 
the National Crime Information Center to develop a national list of nearly 21,000 law enforcement 
agencies eligible for COPS funding. These agencies were stratified according to COPS grant status 
and jurisdiction size as follows (see table A.4). 
Table A.4.  Sampling frame by fundinglprogram status and population category for 1996  cops survey* 
Population  Agencies not funded  COPS FAST-AHEAD  COPS UHP  COPS MORE 
group  through COPS  grantees  grantees  grantees  Total 
.....  Less than 50,000  .......  8,373  5,845  1,186  1,136  16,540 
50.000 or more  267  546  159  349  1.321 
Missing  4,208  79  4,287 
Total  12,848  6,391  1,345  1,564  22,148 
Some agencies are counted more than once due to participation in multiple COPS grant programs. 
.......................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 
.......................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 
The FAST/AHEAD and Universal Hiring Program (UHP)  strata refer to different COPS hiring 
grant programs.  The MORE stratum corresponds to agencies which were funded to acquire 
technology or civilians and/or to pay overtime for additional patrol.49 
The size stratification  point of 50,000 residents was based in part on administrative distinctions established for 
early COPS grants.  In late 1994, the COPS Office established the Funding Accelerated for Small Towns (FAST) 
program for agencies serving populations of 50,000 or less. The program had simplified application procedures 
to speed processing.  At the same time, the COPS Office established the Accelerated Hiring, Education, and 
49 
The Police Hiring and Retention (H&R)  Survey  7 1 
This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has
not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the
author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of
Justice.UI staff sampled over 2,000 of  these agencies for a first-wave interview in the fall of  1996. The 
designed sampling fractions are shown below (table AS).  Based on substantive and statistical 
considerations, project staff sampled disproportionately from among COPS grantees and large 
agencies. Nonetheless, the sample is a nationally representative sample weighted to produce national 
estimates. 
Table A.5.  Designed sampling fraction by fundingprogram status and 
population category for 1996 COPS Survey 
Population  Agencies not funded  COPS FAST-AHEAD  COPS UHP  COPS MORE 
group  through COPS  grantees  grantees  grantees  Total 
Less than 50,000  0.013  0.048  0.236  0.248  0.057 
50,000 or more  1  .o  0.498  1  .o  0.777  0.734 
~ -------------.----..-_I-..__._I_________ 
~  -  -  -  ~ 
Missina  0.044  0.044 
Total  0.044  0.086  0.326  0.354  0.095 
Table A.6 presents the response rates for the 1996 COPS survey. 
Table A.6.  Survey response rates by fundingprogram status and 
population category (in percentages) for 1996 cops survey 
Population  Agencies not funded  COPS FAST-AHEAD  COPS UHP  COPS MORE  - 
group  through COPS  grantees  grantees  grantees  Total 
Less than 50,000  ~  61  84  ~  ~  78  ~  75  ~  77 
50,000 or more  67  78  99  84  80  .......................................................................................................................................... 
Missin  61  61 
Total  64  81  85  79  77 
................ 8  ...........................................  ........................................  ..............................................  ...  .  ...............................  .................................................... 
For the COPS / H&R survey in the summer of 2000, we sought to re-interview the 1,471 agencies 
which participated in the 1996 survey. Telephone interviewers from the National Opinion Research 
Center (NORC) completed interviews with 1,270, or 86% of the target agencies. Table A.7 presents 
the response rates by stratum for the H&R survey. Interviewers achieved a response rate of  83% or 
higher for each cell. 
Table A.7.  Completed interviews and response rates (in parentheses) 
by  funding-program status and population category for 2000 COPS-H&R survey* 
Population  Agencies not funded  COPS FAST-AHEAD  COPS UHP  COPS MORE 
group  through COPS  grantees  grantees  grantees  Total 
Less than 50,000  146  199  183  189  717 
Total 
. -  (.855)  ~  ~ (.886)  (.880)  __  (.910)  (.885) 
293  386  315  390  1384 
(.842)  (.875)  (.863)  (.903)  (.873) 
*  Some agencies are counted more than once due to participation in multiple COPS grant programs 
Deployment (AHEAD)  program, which had more stringent application procedures, for agencies serving larger 
jurisdictions.  These early programs were later replaced by  the Universal Hiring Program (UHP),  which applies 
to agencies of all sizes.  e 
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population into the small non-COPS group for the H&R survey. Note also that because some agencies 
had multiple grants as of  1996 and were thus eligible to be sampled more than once, the interview 
numbers sum across the cells to 1,384 rather than to 1,270,  the actual number interviewed (i.e., some 
agencies are counted more than once in the table above). 
UI staff developed a weighting scheme for the 1996 survey to account for the agencies’ 
differential probabilities of selection into the sample, adjusting for non-response and aligning the 
weighted distribution of agencies in the sample with the distribution of agencies in the U.S. population 
of police agencies. In the simplest case, each agency in the same grant program and population 
category has the same weight. If j is the index for grant program and k  is the index for population 
category, then the weight, Wjk,  for a particular grant program and population category is 
where U,,  is the number of agencies in the population and S,,  is the number of agencies with 
completed interviews in the sample. If, however, an agency received funding for multiple grants, then 
the agency had a selection probability and sample weight for each program.  For multi-program 
agencies, therefore, the weight is the average of the agency’s program weights (i.e., the arithmetic 
average probability of being selected into the sample). Because the H&R survey response rates were 
high and did not differ significantly across strata, we retained these weights for the H&R analyses. 
Further details of the original survey design and weighting scheme are provided in Roth et al. (2000a, 
wjk  = ujk  1 sjk 
pp. 275-287). 
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